The politics of trade between the european union and the gulf cooperation council by Audi, Hiba
 LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
Interregionalism: 
The Politics of Trade between the European Union and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council 
 
 
By 
 
Hiba Audi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of 
Masters of Arts in International Affairs 
 
 
 
 
School of Arts and Sciences 
June 2014 
 
ii 
 
L e b a n e s e A m e r i c a n U n i v e r s i t y  
 
School of   Arts and Sciences; Beirut Campus 
 
 
 
 
THESIS APPROVAL FORM 
 
Student Name :  Hiba Audi                 I.D. #:  201205834    
 
Thesis Title:  Interregionalism: The Politics of Trade between the European Union and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
 
 
 
   Program:   M.A. in International Affairs  
 
 
 
Department:  Political Studies and International Affairs  
 
 
 
School:  School of Arts and Sciences  
 
 
 
 
The undersigned certify that they have examined the final electronic copy of this 
thesis and approved it in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of: 
 
 Masters of Art in the major of International Affairs  
 
Thesis Advisor’s Name: Dr. Sami Baroudi Signature  
Date: 3/June/2014 
 
Committee Member’s Name: Dr. Imad Salamey Signatur
Date: 3/June/2014 
Committee Member’s Name:  Dr. Jennifer Skulte-Ouiass Signature  
Date: 3/June/2014 
 
  
iii 
 
 
THESIS COPYRIGHT RELEASE FORM 
 
LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY NON-EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION 
LICENSE 
By signing and submitting this license, you (the author(s) or copyright owner) grants to 
Lebanese American University (LAU) the non-exclusive right to reproduce, translate (as 
defined below), and/or distribute your submission (including the abstract) worldwide in 
print and electronic format and in any medium, including but not limited to audio or 
video. You agree that LAU may, without changing the content, translate the submission 
to any medium or format for the purpose of preservation. You also agree that LAU may 
keep more than one copy of this submission for purposes of security, backup and 
preservation. You represent that the submission is your original work, and that you have 
the right to grant the rights contained in this license. You also represent that your 
submission does not, to the best of your knowledge, infringe upon anyone's copyright. If 
the submission contains material for which you do not hold copyright, you represent that 
you have obtained the unrestricted permission of the copyright owner to grant LAU the 
rights required by this license, and that such third -party owned material is clearly 
identified and acknowledged within the text or content of the submission. IF THE 
SUBMISSION IS BASED UPON WORK THAT HAS BEEN SPONSORED OR 
SUPPORTED BY AN AGENCY OR ORGANIZATION OTHER THAN LAU, YOU 
REPRESENT THAT YOU HAVE FULFILLED ANY RIGHT OF REVIEW OR 
OTHER OBLIGATIONS REQUIRED BY SUCH CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT. 
LAU will clearly identify your name(s) as the author(s) or owner(s) of the submission, 
and will not make any alteration, other than as allowed by this license, to your 
submission. 
 
Name: Hiba Audi 
Signature:   Date: 22/5/2014 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLAGIARISM POLICY COMPLIANCE STATEMENT 
 
 
I certify that: 
 
 I have read and understood LAU’s Plagiarism Policy. 
 I understand that failure to comply with this Policy can lead to academic and 
disciplinary actions against me. 
 This work is substantially my own, and to the extent that any part of this work is 
not my own I have indicated that by acknowledging its sources. 
 
 
 
Name: Hiba Ziad Audi 
 
Signature:  
Date: 22/5/2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedicated to 
Daulat, Ziad and Hadi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
This thesis would not have been possible without the support of many people.  Many 
thanks to my advisor Dr. Sami Baroudi who put ample efforts in helping me produce this 
thesis and provided valuable insight. I am also deeply grateful to the committee members 
of this thesis namely Dr. Jennifer Skulte-Ouaiss and Dr. Imad Salemey, who were kind 
enough to be part of the Committee. And finally many thanks to my parents, brother and 
numerous friends who constantly supported me and endured this long process with me, 
always offering support and love. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
vii 
 
Interregionalism: 
The Politics of Trade between the European Union and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council  
 
Hiba Ziad Audi 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Interregionalism is a recent phenomenon that emerged during the mid-20th century as a 
direct consequence of the movement towards regional blocs. The European Union (EU) 
came to being following the end of World War II as the first regional grouping of its 
kind. The EU model set in motion a number of other regional integration projects. One 
such regional grouping that was inspired by the EU success is the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). With the growing importance of regional blocs, interregionalism arose as 
the venue in which regional groupings interact. The European Union and The Gulf 
Cooperation Council were among the first groupings to initiate interregional interactions 
by signing a cooperation agreement in 1989. Focusing on economic issues, this 
agreement represented the first step towards establishing a Free Trade Agreement 
between the two blocs. But despite the passage of nearly 25 years since the signing of the 
Cooperation Agreement, the two sides are yet to conclude a Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA). After presenting theories of regionalism and interregionalism and providing 
background information on the two regional blocs, the thesis interrogates the history of 
interregional relations between them in order to shed light on the likely reasons for the 
delay in signing an FTA; and the future prospects of reaching such an agreement. 
Keywords: Regionalism, Interregionalism, European Union, Gulf Cooperation Council, 
Free Trade Agreement 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Introduction 
1.1 Overview  
Regionalism existed centuries before the term was defined, and relations between 
regions− also known as interregionalism− are not a new phenomenon, as they have also 
existed during other eras. Nevertheless, the way we define these terms has changed. That 
is because over time, political events and global advancements have changed the way we 
have come to understand regions.   
With the continuing growth of globalization and regionalism as movements, the way 
trade is conducted has dramatically changed. This thesis will look into the rise of 
interregionalism between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the European Union 
(EU) through evaluating the interregional cooperation agreements between the two. 
These agreements have been focused on trade since their inception and have been 
implemented only in trade related issues; therefore making trade relations central to the 
rise of interregionalism between the two blocs. Yet political relations between the two 
blocs also developed in the absence of consensus on economic issues. 
Interregionalism is an understudied field that has been euro-centric for a long period of  
time, yet interregional relations have developed and  nowadays almost all nation states 
are party to one regional grouping or another. The international system no longer 
constitutes interactions between nation states strictly, but developed to include relations 
between regional blocs. This reality of the current international system, alongside the 
relatively small amount of literature published on the EU-GCC interregional relationship 
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were the main drivers behind the choice of topic. This thesis then becomes central in 
mapping out the history of the relationship and the attempting to make some conclusions 
on the prospects of this interregional relationship. 
1.2 Aim of the thesis 
 
This is a study on the EU-GCC relationship with a special focus on its trade component. 
The study has several aims.  First it seeks to shed light on the applicability of theories on 
regionalism and interregionalism to understand one specific case of interregionalism: the 
EU-GCC partnership. Second it seeks to underscore the asymmetric nature of this 
relationship, since the GCC is more dependent on trade with the EU than vise-versa. 
 
Third, it sheds light on why despite this asymmetry the relationship remains quite 
important for the stronger partner, namely the EU. Fourth, it examines the obstacles that 
hindered the achievement of a free trade agreement between the two blocs and speculates 
on the prospects of concluding this agreement in the foreseeable future. Fifth, it seeks to 
situate this relationship within a broader political context by examining the multi-faceted 
political relationship between the GCC and the EU.  
By the end of the thesis the reader will hopefully acquire a good understanding of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the EU GCC relationship, how this relationship evolved , the 
obstacles that were encountered and the implications of the different institutional settings 
of the EU and the GCC for the relationship.  
3 
 
Research Questions 
While this thesis focuses mostly on the interregional relations between the European 
Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council, it embarks on evaluating the theoretical bases 
of interregionalism as well. The below four research questions are addressed in this thesis 
and are discussed in detail in the chapters to come. The questions aim at understanding 
the emergence of regionalism, the emergence of interregionalism in the form of trade 
between blocs, tracking the history of trade, and finally embedding Regional trade 
between the EU and GCC in the politics of today.  
The first research question is rooted in the fact that interregionalism stems from 
regionalism and regional groupings, therefore it is important to understand first: What is 
regionalism, and how did the EU and GCC develop as regions? These research questions 
addressed in the second chapter will tackle the theoretical explanation of the emergence 
of regionalism in the international world order and how it brought about interregionalism. 
The third chapter will address what interregionalism is, and how did the EU-GCC 
interregional relations develop? Since the EU and the GCC represent trading blocs and 
have developed their relationship around trade mainly, the third questions inquire into 
how these trading blocs interacted in the past, what is the History of trade between the 
EU and the GCC? This question will be addressed in the fourth Chapter of the thesis and 
will include trade flows between the EU and the GCC.  
It is important to look at trade patterns and analyze them in order to be able to make 
conclusion about the future prospects of the relationship between the two blocs. The 
fourth question will address the future prospects of the Free Trade Agreement and what 
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are the reasons behind the slow development of these interregional relations? These 
questions will be tackled in the fifth and final chapter.   
1.3 Methodology  
The study builds on theories of regionalism and interregionalism in order to establish a 
framework for analyzing the interregional relationship between the GCC and the EU. 
These theories are thus employed to provide a theoretical underpinning for studying this 
relationship. Given the dearth of scholarly work on the EU GCC relationship, the study 
relies on primary sources namely studies and empirical data provided by the EU and the 
GCC.  
The thesis will thus address the research questions outlined above through an 
examination of the existing theoretical literature on regionalism and interregionalism, the 
few scholarly publications on trade and trade relations between the European Union and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, and especially primary sources published by the EU and 
the GCC. Statistical data constitute an important source for this thesis, and will be 
analyzed in chapter four in order to shed light on the nature of the EU GCC relationship.   
Therefore this thesis will rely on a blend on secondary and primary sources. Its 
overarching goal is to shed light on the applicability of theories of interregionalism to the 
case of the EU GCC relationship.  
1.4 Limitations 
Several limitations were discovered while conducting this research. First was the 
unavailability of scholarly published research on the interregional relationship between 
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the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Even though interregionalism as 
a phenomenon has been widely discussed in the literature; has not been discussed in the 
context of relations between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. This, 
in retrospect increased the difficulty of this research.  
Another limitation to this research was the inconsistency present within the literature 
concerning trade trends. While the fact that the Gulf institutions have more published on 
the topic of trade with the EU than any other institutes is in itself a limitation to the 
literature present for evaluations; there is an obvious rift in the opinions and prospects 
published by European institutions versus Gulf institutions. Nevertheless this research 
will attempt to overcome this problem by aiming for objectivity.  
1.5 Map of Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Following this introductory chapter, the second 
chapter will examine regionalism and the emergence of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) and the European Union (EU) as regional blocs. The third chapter discusses 
interregionalism as well as the interregional relations between the two blocs, focusing on 
the history of interregional relations between the two blocs and discussing the Free Trade 
Agreement. The fourth chapter examines the history of trade relations between the two 
blocs and the politics of interregionalism. The fifth and final chapter marks the 
conclusion for the thesis and spells out its findings. 
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1.6 EU-GCC Interregionalism 
Interregionalism is defined as an international phenomenon of linkages built between 
regions. They are based on regular summits and ministerial meetings as well as a number 
of joint projects. The rise of interregionalism was a direct consequence of the rise of 
regionalism and globalization after the Second World War (Hanggi, 2000). This study 
will dig deep into the theory of interregionalism and will examine interregional relations 
vis-à-vis trade relations between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council.   
Interregionalism between the two blocs dates back to 1989 when a Cooperation 
Agreement was established between the European Economic Community( EEC) and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The agreement of 1989 included the 
strengthening of political relations and the broadening of cooperation in the sectors of 
energy, industry, trade and investment between the two blocs.  The following 
agreement was set as a basis for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to be negotiated 
between the two blocs, but so far no consensus has been reached on the FTA 
(European Union External Action website, 2014). 
In 2010 the joint council of representatives from the EU and the GCC−established under 
the Cooperation Agreement of 1989− agreed on a Joint Action Programme for 2010-13 
as part of the implementation of the Cooperation Agreement. The Cooperation 
Agreement of 1989 still remains the framework for improving the relations between the 
two blocs on both political and economic issues (Koch et al., 2005). 
Trade relations between the Gulf Region and Europe date back several centuries before 
the establishment of both the Gulf Corporation Council and the European Union; 
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nevertheless the nature of trade relations between the two has changed since then. 
Initially European countries− mostly Great Britain− traded individually with tribal clans 
in the Gulf. But following the state formation in the Gulf and the establishment of the 
European Union, trade relations took a new form. (Wilson, 1998) 
The new form of trade between the two is that of trade between regional blocs rather than 
bilateral trade between individual states- yet bilateralism still prevails and will be 
discussed in this thesis. This phenomenon is largely credited to the emergence of the 
European Union as a single cooperating entity. The emergence of regionalism followed 
by interregionalism is a relatively new phenomenon that has been witnessed over the last 
decade. Since the early 2000’s there has been a theoretical move towards discussing the 
regions and the relations between them, and that is due to the rise of what is known as 
‘new regionalism’ and ‘open interregionalism’ (Teló et al., 2007). 
Interregionalism between these two blocs has changed in nature from 1989 till 2013 
mimicking the change witnessed globally in interregionalism. This study will look 
specifically into interregional trade and the change in interregionalism. Trade is used as 
the dependent variable because it receives a lot of focus in the cooperation agreements 
mentioned above. It also constitutes the basis on which these two blocs communicate, 
consequently affecting their political relation as well.   
This research is important to the scholarly field because it has not been addressed in this 
manner before. While regional and interregional studies have been around for a while, the 
research published was mainly focused on the relations of the EU with East Asian blocs 
such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Gulf region and the 
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GCC were acknowledged in publications as a regional bloc, but interregionalism between 
the EU and the GCC was never given full focus.  
In the age of declining oil reserves and increasing prices of energy, the Gulf Region 
which contains 40.8% of the world’s total oil reserves is considered as a major energy 
hub (OPEC, 2013).Therefore, the EU-GCC interregional relation shop is central in 
terms of energy trade and investments. Given the current geo-political events in 
Ukraine as well as during the Arab uprisings; the EU-GCC relationship gains 
monumental importance. Nevertheless, trade between the two extends beyond just 
energy and to include other sectors as well. 
A recurrent theme in the literature published on the subject is the undeveloped nature of 
the cooperation processes between these two blocs.
1
 Several authors point out to the 
shortcomings the GCC faces internally in terms of institutionalization and weak 
governance. The different ways in which the EU and the GCC are structured as regional 
blocs, lies at the heart of the problem (Luciani & Schumacher, 2004). The following 
thesis will attempt to uncover the reasons behind this and predict the future of this 
relationship in the political context of the region. 
Such research could prove useful to policy making in both the GCC and the EU because 
it looks at the rise of interregionalism which is evaluated by looking over the trade trends 
between the two blocs. Therefore this paper could serve as an addition to the research 
already present in the field on regionalism and interregionalism. It will also add to the 
                                                 
1
 The weaknesses were discussed in several publications, some of which are Kostadinova- What is the 
status of the EU-GCC Relationship? (2013), Koch- Constructing a viable EU-GCC partnership (2014), and 
Ayadi & Gadi- EU-GCC Trade and Investment Relations: What Prospect of an FTA between the Two 
Regions? (2013) 
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knowledge already present about the topic and serve as a case study on trade between two 
regional blocs- the EU and the GCC- which has not been discussed before.  
The next chapter will look at the history of regionalism and its theoretical evolution in 
order to set the stage for the introduction of interregionalism and the interregional 
relationship between the EU and the GCC. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Theorizing Regionalism 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the past century and throughout the early twenty-first century there has been an 
increase in the number of economic regions which represented an intensification of 
regionalism globally. Out of the 126 currently existing regional groupings over 50 were 
formed during the 1990’s (Hanggi, Roloff & Ruland, 2006). The international system has 
always had regions which interact among each other more than they interact with other 
regions. Nevertheless there has been a growth in the number and significance in 
economic regions since the end of the Second World War. 
This chapter presents theories of regionalism as a prelude to the subsequent chapters that 
draw on these theories to understand the evolving relations between two economic 
regions: the EU and the GCC. Interregionalism cannot be understood without direct 
reference to regions and regionalism. The evolution of regionalism has been a major 
contributor to the emergence of interregionalism and bilateral interregional arrangements 
(Doidge, 2011). 
The chapter looks at the historical evolution of regions and the development of 
regionalism into what is now called new regionalism. It also looks at the phases and types 
of regionalism that have emerged over time. Finally, the European Union and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council will be introduced and the history of these blocs will be discussed. 
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2.2 Regions and Old Regionalism 
Regions were historically perceived as geographically-defined areas including at least 
two states or political entities. This state centric definition of regionalism which still 
prevails does not provide an accurate picture of the current forms of regionalism around 
the world. Regionalism has evolved from the 1920’s till now and it has developed to take 
different forms. New definitions of regions have emerged that better portray regionalism 
in the post-World War One era.  
As defined by Louise Fawcet in “Regionalism from an Historical Perspective” (2005), 
regions are units based on groups, states, or territories. They are geographical areas 
consisting of independent states which pursue shared economic, social and political 
values and objectives. They are smaller than the international system of states, but larger 
than any individual state. Some are temporary while others are permanent; they even vary 
in levels of institutionalization.  
The members share some traits such as culture and history, but nevertheless regions have 
to be constructed socially and politically, in order to serve specific purposes. The sense of 
common identity does not give rise to a region but it is rather through the establishment 
of regions that such identities are created, formulated and enforced over time. Regions 
can be fluid and dynamic in nature. There is no ideal definition or form for a region but it 
varies depending on the composition and agenda.  
Following this, regionalism is then defined as a conscious policy project between nation 
states or non-state actors in order to manage, co-ordinate and cooperate a broad array of 
challenges. Rules, norms and procedures are formed in order to pursue several goals, 
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most of which tackle security and economic challenges originating from outside the 
region. Regionalism can have both a proactive and a defensive dimension (Hanggi, 
Roloff & Ruland, 2006). 
As spelled out by Fawcet in the chapter “Regionalism from an Historical Perspective” 
(2005), regionalism can vary in levels from soft regionalism to hard regionalism 
depending on the level of institutionalization of regionalism. According to the author, a 
successful regional project is one that incorporates all levels within the state including the 
government of the state, non-state actors and other groups. Intra-state actors such as Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups are playing a growing role 
in regionalism.  
During the last two decades of the past century, there was a major debate in the literature 
on whether globalization and regionalism constituted a new world order. Regionalism has 
always been viewed as the opposite of unilateralism, mirroring the different policies 
adopted by the two major regional blocs – mainly the United States and North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA) on the one hand, and the European Union on the other.   In the 
current era of globalization (1990’s-present) states resort to a variety of unilateral, 
regional and global initiatives to manage their economies and their latter  relationship 
with the global economy.  
Regionalism and unilateralism function on different levels making way for new regions 
and regional arrangements to emerge. Nevertheless, sovereignty still remains a basic 
constituent for statehood as well as a sensitive topic even within regional blocs. New 
forms of regionalism have emerged that deal with this problem and keep sovereignty 
13 
 
unhampered with. In order to better understand the process we should take a look at the 
phases of evolution of regionalism to what is now called new regionalism.  
There is a mere consensus in the literature that despite the movement towards a global 
economy, economic regions such as NAFTA, ASEAN, the EU and the GCC are gaining 
importance. Mario Teló in the work European Union and New Regionalism (2007) as 
well as Mathew Doidge in The European Union and Interregionalism (2011) undertake a 
thorough evaluation of these phases. According to them there were three phases of 
regionalism in the twentieth century. While given different titles by authors, these three 
phases were unanimously agreed upon. 
 The first phase was ‘imperial regionalism’, which focused on hegemonic powers and 
their political spheres of influence. This phase was markedly different than the phases to 
follow. It focused on hegemonic European powers aligning with smaller states in order to 
secure their own interests. This resulted in a closed competitive system where regions 
were highly independent from each other and relied on their corresponding hegemons. It 
was not long before the first phase ended. According to a number of works, imperial 
regionalism contributed significantly to the eruption of WWI, due to the closed and 
competitive system generating tension and bloodshed. (Doidge, 2011) 
Following the end of World War One and with the Establishment of the League of 
Nations, regionalism resurfaced. Under the covenant of The League of Nations a specific 
article was assigned conferring legitimacy to regional groups. Article 21 of the covenant 
states that: “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of 
international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like 
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the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.”  Therefore, this article 
became the base for the legitimate formation of regional agreements in International Law. 
Even though the League of Nations failed to survive, the idea of regionalism persisted 
and was renewed with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945. The United States 
took over the international system by the end of World War Two and was able to prove 
itself as a hegemon. Regional organizations proliferated all over the world and large 
institutions and new monetary systems were established - such as the IMF and the World 
Bank (Teló et al., 2007). 
Following the end of the Second World War, a second phase of regionalism emerged 
called closed regionalism which is also commonly known as old regionalism. This phase 
constituted greater state cooperation and arrangements formed on matters of sovereign 
equality and collective goals. Yet, this phase was still considered closed because of its 
‘inward focus’ on exclusive economic advancements and projects that aim at protecting 
domestic interests  
Alongside being economic in nature, these regional arrangements incorporated security 
aspects. The European Economic Community was first formed against the backdrop of 
fear of slipping back to civil war in Europe. Also, other regional arrangements such as the 
Gulf Cooperation Council were formed alongside similar security concerns stemming 
from their Iranian neighbor. The European Economic Community became the model for 
cooperative regional agreements (Doidge, 2011). 
During the second phase of regionalism the European Community was established with 
the help of American support. Even new regional groupings started to form in less 
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developed parts of the world such as East Asia, Latin American and Africa (Teló et al, 
2007). ‘Old regionalism’ according to Hanggi is best manifested in the early formation of 
the European Union (Hanggi, 2000). There is an important distinction to be made 
between the second phases of regionalism that emerged in Europe versus the second 
phase in other areas of the world. 
Mathew Doidge (2011) emphasizes this distinction with the contextual debate that took 
place during that time. Dependency theory brought into question the future of these small 
states in the evolving economic system which favored them in peripheral positions while 
the core developed. This caused a movement of states to aggregate and form regional 
blocs in order to be recognized and heard as a single voice on the international arena.  
Nevertheless, this second phase of regionalism in developing countries failed due to 
internal conditions in these regions that forced their policy projects to be focused 
inwards. Domestic issues took the place of the development of proper external policies. 
States were not willing to give up any aspects of their sovereignty to regional institutions; 
instead they sought to further their capacities (Doidge, 2011). 
The second phase of closed regionalism was a success for the European Union. Old 
regionalism is Euro-centric due to the fact that the European Union was the successful 
model that emerged; therefore the EU example occupied the center of attention in the 
literature on regionalism. On a practical level, the EU became a model to emulate by 
other emerging economic regions. The European Union during this period sought to 
develop its internal identity as well as its external relations with other regional blocs 
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around the world. It also introduced a range of new economic and foreign policy projects 
(Doidge, 2011). 
According to Hanggi −the forefather of old interregionalism− the European Union was 
the driving force behind the formation of closed regionalism (Hanggi, Roloff & Ruland, 
2006). However, the limited willingness as well as the limited ability of other regional 
blocs to act beyond national interest and pursue a proactive role was the reason for this 
failure (Doidge, 2011). A new Phase of regionalism emerged in the 1990’s called new 
regionalism. New regionalism is representative of the regionalism we witness today and 
serves as bases for interregional relations. 
2.3 New Regionalism 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the decline of American hegemony in the 
1990’s post-hegemonic regionalism emerged according to Mario Teló. Post-hegemonic 
regionalism (Teló et al., 2007), open regionalism (Doidge, 2011) and what is also 
commonly known as new regionalism was a new phase that gave rise to new groupings 
and incorporated new elements (Teló et al., 2007). The post-cold war period witnessed an 
exponential growth in the number and membership of regional organizations as interest in 
new regionalism grew. 
 While old regionalism was a process that stemmed from internal dynamics of security 
and economy; new regionalism was caused by external endogenous forces such as 
globalization. With the emergence of globalization we have witnessed opposing 
movements of integration and fragmentation. Even though globalization emerged before 
regionalism, new regionalism and globalization are considered multi-dimensional 
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interconnected phenomena that function in cycles that support each other (Hanggi, Roloff 
& Ruland, 2006). 
What seems evident nevertheless is the increased level of connection between states and 
their societies. Globalization gave way to regionalism because the nation state needed 
supra-state entities to address problem brought about by globalization
2
. These policy 
initiatives, which were implemented to solve the problems brought about by 
globalization, were embedded in agreements and institutionalized relations that in return 
heightened interdependence.  
It would be erroneous to claim that the main cause of ‘new regionalism’ was the end of 
the cold war. The main sources of new regionalism were primarily internal in nature; 
emanating from within the regions themselves. It was regarded as a multidimensional 
form of integration embracing economic, cultural, political, and social aspects. It 
extended beyond classical regionalism and beyond the creation of free trade agreements 
or security regimes. Its scope was no longer restricted to Europe but extended to cover 
the global north and south. Regionalism in the 1990’s was marked by the openness and 
willingness to regionalize economic relations (Farell, Hettne & Langenhove, 2005). 
The Single European Act in 1986−that led to the formation of the Single European 
Market (SEM) − was the trigger for new regionalism across the globe. The second wave 
of regionalism proliferated beyond Europe and Latin America to include newly formed 
regional arrangements in Asia-Pacific. This occurred alongside the widening of already 
                                                 
2
 Problems like transportation, human trafficking, drugs as well as other issues that could no longer be 
regulated by the state alone; it required regional regulations, mechanism and institutions to control its flow.  
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existing regional arrangements such as the European Union (EU) and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Teló et al., 2007). 
Mathew Doidge in The European Union and Interregionalism (2011) even argues that 
new regionalism or what he calls open regionalism was forced upon states. It was a 
survival mechanism in the developing world order, where economic liberalization, 
foreign trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) became a necessity for survival. In a 
way, regionalism was perceived as the solution for what globalization brought about.  
Therefore old interregional arrangements that were based on traditional group-to-group 
dialogues, now developed to become ‘new interregional’ relations. This new paradigm 
did not only include more partnerships, but also developed to include partnerships with 
organizations and looser aggregations of states. This phenomenon was not evident under 
old regionalism (Hanggi, Roloff & Ruland, 2006). 
The international system during the 1990’s when new regionalism emerged was 
characterized by a decentralized decision making process, which pushed for economic 
liberalization and greater openness. The changing power balances between regions found 
new forms of expression in practices and institutionalized arrangements. The post-cold 
war era demanded greater region awareness and involvement. The evolution of economic 
relations within regions depended less on state initiatives and more on the actions of 
corporations and non-state actors within the region (Farell, Hettne & Langenhove, 2005). 
The international environment has allowed for better avenues for expression, making it 
easier for regional blocs to voice concerns and asserts identities on the international 
arena. Hegemonic powers were accepting of this change, embraced it, and even 
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supported it. Even the United States, which follows a highly unilateral rather than 
regional agenda, chose to enroll in a regional grouping, specifically the North Atlantic 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in order to protect and promote its economic and 
ideological interests (Doidge, 2011). 
Contemporary Regionalism is made up of different regionalisms reflecting different 
conditions. In the new regionalism, regions were no longer regarded as formal 
organizations but were rather understood to be constructed and reconstructed in the 
process of globalization. Following the present explanation and under this theoretical 
framework, the thesis will move to look over the development of the European Union and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council as regional blocs. 
2.4 The European Economic Community (EEC) and the European 
Union (EU) 
When discussing regionalism and interregionalism, it is very important to highlight the 
major role that the European Union has had in the advancement of this field of study. The 
EU had major influences on the literature published on interregionalism as well as the 
process other regions undertook to establish regional relations with each other. While 
there is no ideal form for regional blocs, the European Union definitely marks the best 
example available for regional integration. 
The EU has evolved during both phases of old regionalism and new regionalism and 
matured into a regional community. They structured a governance scheme that is 
complex, comprehensive and that overcomes national sovereignty (Farrell, Hettne & 
Langenhove, 2005). While the European Union lacks a unified foreign policy agenda, the 
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Union’s international relations are to a great extent executed through interregionalism. 
Before going into deeper comparative analysis of the EU’s regional project, it is first 
essential to briefly delve into the history of the European Union. 
Following the end of the Second World War, European countries decided to put an end to 
all blood shed between neighbors. The Schuman Plan introduced by the French foreign 
minister at that time, Robert Schuman, set out to make war between European Countries 
unthinkable. This plan gave way to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) on 18
 
April 1951. It was based on a common agreement to run their 
heavy industries under the common management of the six founding members: Germany, 
France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg (History of the European 
Union, Europa Website). 
The first wave of regionalism in Europe stemmed from Security concerns. With the 
outset of the cold war, security concerns were primarily addressed through the 
establishment of NATO.  Subsequent efforts at European integration came to focus on the 
economic, especially trade, dimension. The success of the ECSC led to the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome on the 25
th
 of March 1957 which marked the creation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) as well as the Establishments of EURATOM. The 
development of closed regionalism in Europe was different than its development in other 
parts of the world
3
, making it a pioneer in the field of regional integration. (History of the 
European Union, Europa Website) 
                                                 
3
 The European Union since its outset had incorporated a willingness to break away from national 
sovereignty and entrusting supranational institutions such as the High Authority and later the European 
Parliament. Part of this was included an external focus by giving such institutions the power to establish 
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The treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) is considered as the 
starting point for the creation of the regional organization – the EU. The treaty is an 
extensive document outlining the basic guideline for the establishment of the community 
and the process through which its goals could be achieved. The treaty set out to promote 
the European community through the development of economic activities such as the 
reduction of custom duties and the establishment of a common customs tariff.  
The EEC aimed to raise the standards of living by creating common markets of goods, 
workers, services and capital; as well as creating common transport and agriculture 
policies to service the member states. The Assembly, the European Council, the 
European Commission, and the Court Of Justice were all appointed specific sections in 
the treaty according them legitimacy and setting out their functioning (Treaty for the 
Establishment of the EEC, 1957). 
The 1970’s witnessed several advancements and achievements in EU regionalism. The 
first step towards a single currency was taken in the early 1970’s; when the members of 
the EU decided to maintain monetary stability by allowing their currencies to fluctuate 
against each other within narrow boundaries. The creation of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) on 24 April 1972 led to the establishment of the Euro 30 years later. 
The 1970’s also witnessed another major advancement with the first EU enlargement 
taking place on the first of January 1973. The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
joined the European Economic Community, expanding it from six members to nine 
members. In 1979 the first EU parliamentary elections took place where people voted for 
                                                                                                                                                 
diplomatic relations with other countries, regions and international organizations- such as the U.N. and 
OEEC (Doidge, 2011). 
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their delegates instead of the delegates being appointed by each member state. This in 
turn increased the involvement of the people in the affairs of the Community and 
increased the influence of the European Parliament as a representative of the European 
people’s voices. In 1980’s the second and third enlargement projects took place with the 
addition to the European Community of Greece in 1980 and Spain and Portugal in 1985. 
During the third phase of regionalism known as Open Regionalism, the EU witnessed a 
major expansion in its number of members as well as its policy projects. Several 
groundbreaking treaties were negotiated by the European Community during the 1990’s; 
the most important are the Maastricht Treaty− also known as the treaty of the European 
Union− and the Schengen treaty (History of the EU, Europa Website). The third 
enlargement also took place in 1995 with the addition of Austria, Finland, and Sweden.  
The Single European Currency, the Euro, was first introduced in 1999 in eleven member 
states for commercial and financial transactions. Nevertheless, by the1st of January in 
2002, the Euro Coins and banknotes entered circulation to be used as an everyday 
currency. The Euro as a currency is currently shared by 18 members of the 28 European 
Union's Member States, which together make up the Euro zone (Economical and 
Financial Affairs: the Euro, Europa Website).The introduction of the Euro in 1999 was a 
major step in European integration and it has also been one of its major successes of the 
European Regional project.
4
  
Open regionalism continued to have a major effect on the European Union in the 21
st
 
century as well. Two more enlargements took place and several amendments were made 
                                                 
4
 The Euro countries are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Estonia, and Latvia. 
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to the Maastricht treaty; the final and most important one being the Lisbon treaty which 
came into force in 2009. The first enlargement of the 21
st
 century came on the first of 
May in 2004 with the inclusion of the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. The second enlargement took 
place about three years later and included two more states: Bulgaria and Romania 
(History of the EU, EUROPA website).
5
 
The Lisbon treaty and the fourth enlargement coincided within the same year, making 
2007 a transformative year for the European Union since it provided the union with the 
legal framework and the tools needed to meet the demands of the 21
st
 century. The 
following treaty amended previous EU treaties dating back to 1957, without replacing 
them. It is important to understand that the decision to continue amending old treaties 
stemmed from the fact that the EU member states could not agree on a constitution.  
The Treaty of Lisbon that was signed on 1 January 2007 set out to make amendments in 
four main areas. It called for a more democratic and transparent Europe, with a 
strengthened role for the European Parliament, as well as more efficient working methods 
and tools in order to be able to face the major policy priorities of today. It also called out 
for the promotion of rights and values, freedom, solidarity and security by introducing the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights into European law. Finally, The EU set to increase its 
own role as a global actor through several steps. 
At first it introduced a new High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and a Vice-President of the Commission, which aimed at increasing the 
                                                 
5
 The third and fourth EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 respectively are also referred to the first and 
second enlargements on the 21
st
 century under new regionalism. 
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impact of the EU's external action. Also, a new European External Action Service was 
introduced as well, in order to provide service for the high representative. The EU set out 
to have a single legal personality representing it in international affairs in order to 
increase its effectiveness as an actor. Finally, it set out to achieve progress on Security 
and Defense policies (Lisbon Treaty: Treaty at a glance, Europa Website). 
Six decades after the beginning of the European regionalist project, the European Union 
has established itself as an actor of significance in the global arena and has become the 
most developed organization of its kind. The European Union has institutionalized its 
own rule of law and set out its goals in its different areas of activity accordingly. It has 
created its own unique economic and political partnership between 28 European countries 
(Doidge, 2011). 
The initial impetus for regionalism in Europe came from security concerns, but as these 
concerns were addressed through the framework of a North Atlantic partnership, 
regionalism acquired an economic focus. The economic union was completed in the early 
1990’s with the removal of merely all impediments to movement of goods, services and 
capital. Since the debut of the Euro in 2002, the EU strengthened its structure for tackling 
problems internal and external to the union. The ranges of issues that fall under the 
preview of the EU are vast, covering politics, economics, social issues and the 
environment. One important landmark in the transition was the renaming of the European 
Economic Community to the European Union in 1993. A subsequent important landmark 
was the launching of the Euro (Doidge, 2011). 
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The EU fulfilled its initial aim by delivering half a century of peace, stability and 
prosperity as well as launching a single European currency, the Euro. Its internal market 
was the main economic engine which enabled most goods, services, money and people to 
move freely. Since then, a huge single market has been created in Europe and continues 
to develop towards its full potential; while consequently influencing other regionalist 
projects around the world. 
2.5 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
The term regionalism is often accompanied by a positive approach from states and non-
state actors. The international system encourages, promotes and seeks to form regional 
and international agreements. Nevertheless, when it comes to regional integration the six 
Gulf States of the Arabian Peninsula were skeptical about undergoing such a step. The 
European experience had an obvious positive influence on other regional projects around 
the world, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) being one of them.  
As part of the second wave of regionalism− closed regionalism− The Council for the 
Arab Gulf States was created under security concerns similar to the ones that led to the 
establishment of the EU. According to Matteo Legrenzi in The GCC and the 
International Relations of the Gulf (2008) two events in 1980’s explain the establishment 
of the GCC: the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. 
The idea of a ‘Gulf Union’ dates back to the early 1970’s. Several meetings were held in 
1976 and 1978 to discuss security agreements between the six gulf monarchies and the 
states of Iraq and Iran. However, these meetings were inconclusive and did not bear fruit, 
but the idea of a Gulf union remained active. Therefore, the early 1980's provided the 
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perfect timing for the establishment of the council since it offered members the 
opportunity to exclude war-ridden Iraq and Iran from the union.  
The Iranian revolution and the threat of exporting the revolution to the neighboring Gulf 
countries guaranteed rivalry with Iran and closer cooperation among the six states. At the 
same time, it also provided them with the opportunity of going beyond the regional 
leverage of Iraq; especially after the various attempts of the Baathist to push for a unified 
security force. The same excuse of internal turmoil used by the six monarchies to exclude 
Iraq was also used to exclude Yemen from the Agreement.  
The positive environment led to the formation of the council within a short span of time. 
The first meeting of the foreign ministers of the six countries to make way for the 
establishment of the cooperation occurred on 4 February 1981. Three models were put 
forth at the meetings, but consensus was reached on a compromise. Throughout the 
meetings, the by-laws, the supreme council and the ministerial council were discussed 
and agreed upon. Yet there was disagreement between Kuwait and Oman over what the 
Charter should include, but final agreement was reached.
 6
 The Charter in its final form 
emphasizes the supremacy of economic and social cooperation between the six members 
(Legrenzi, 2011). 
The Gulf Cooperation Council was established on 25
 
May 1981 during which the leaders 
of the United Arab Emirates, State of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of 
                                                 
6
 Oman and Kuwait had different political outlooks. The Kuwaiti Government was the only gulf state that 
was on speaking terms with the USSR and therefore did not view it as a threat. On the other hand, Oman 
was pushing forward to include security cooperation in the initial GCC Charter. It is also important to note 
that before the meetings held in 1981, The state of Oman put forward a proposal in 1979 for a Joint military 
force between the six gulf states- this step is also viewed as a preset for the formation of the GCC. 
(Legrenzi, 2011) 
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Oman, State of Qatar and State of Kuwait met in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. They 
reached a cooperative framework that guaranteed coordination, integration and inter-
connection among the member states in all fields in order to achieve unity. The Charter 
was signed by all six states and established the rules of procedure of The Supreme 
Council, The Ministerial Council, The Secretariat General and The Commission for the 
Settlement of Disputes (The Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 1981). 
The goals of the union that were set out in the Charter were mostly vague and not 
specific. The charter aims at achieving coordination and integration in all fields; as well 
as deepening and strengthening cooperation between their people in various fields- yet 
the fields are not specified. The Charter also set to formulate similar regulations among 
the six members in economic affairs, commerce, customs, communications, education 
and culture; technological progress in various fields of industry, mining, agriculture, 
water and animal resources. Nevertheless, the Charter did not have specific policies set 
out for implementation and interestingly did not have an article discussing security 
cooperation (The Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 1981). 
The decision to form a union among the six Gulf monarchies was driven by two 
important developments during that time: the successful integration of the European 
Economic Community and the spread of regionalism to underdeveloped regions of the 
world. While some authors were skeptical over the role of the GCC as a regional 
organization, the GCC still fits into that criterion because it underwent economic 
integration. Even though economic cooperation constituted the main ambitions 
highlighted in the Charter of 1981, actual economic integration did not take place till the 
mid 2000’s. 
28 
 
While the initial agreements founding the GCC did not emphasize security issues, 
growing security threats as of the 1980’s prompted the GCC to give more attention to the 
military and security fields. Cooperation received more attention after the formation of 
the union, especially in the meetings following the signing of the Charter. During 
September of the same year −1981− the Ministerial Council made several 
recommendations relating to the enhancement of military cooperation between the six 
states. In January 1982 these recommendations were approved by the Chiefs of General 
Staff and the defense minsters when they convened their first meeting. Al-Jazeerah 
Shield Joint Forces was created and it became a mechanized infantry with full fire and 
fighting logistics.  
Twenty year later, in the year 2000, the GCC signed another military cooperation 
agreement called the ‘GCC Joint Defense Agreement’ that continued the development of 
the Al-Jazeerah Shield Force. It also set out to enhance military cooperation among the 
member states and attain the highest level of coordination of the joint defense concept. 
The follow-up of the joint exercises focused on the importance of development of an 
industrial foundation for the military and encouraged private investments in this field. 
(Digital Library of the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States) 
To return to Economic cooperation, a Unified Economic Agreement was drafted in the 
2
nd 
supreme council meeting in 1981 which constituted the core of the economic 
development programs. Two decades later the Unified Economic Agreement was 
revisited and revised leading to the Economic agreement of 2001. The Unified Economic 
Agreement was agreed upon in December 2001, and expanded on the Charter to include 
several new additions that made the goals of the Union more specific. The document is of 
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a very high importance for the GCC because it provided the legal environment required 
to cope with the new developments in the GCC joint economic action, and to complete 
the requirements of full economic integration among the Member States. The Monetary 
Agreement included articles that discussed the customs union, the common market, the 
monetary union and the single currency, as well as a special article that were dedicated to 
natural resources management. (Digital Library of the Cooperation Council for the Arab 
Gulf States) 
 Accordingly and as specified by the agreement of 2001, a customs union came into 
effect on 1 January 2003. This customs union could not have been possible without the 
signing of a Free Trade Agreement between the six member states in 1983. By 2008 the 
GCC completed the pre-requisites for a common market among its member states and 
launched it in January 2008. During December that same year, The Supreme Council 
adopted the Monetary Union Agreement and the Statute of the Monetary Council 
pursuant as a step towards establishing the Monetary Union and introducing a single 
currency.  
With the successful debut of the Euro, the GCC was encouraged to pursue a unified 
currency of its own through initially pegging the GCC currencies against the US dollar. A 
timetable was set and further emphasized in the Economic Agreement of 2001.  Eight 
years later; in December 2009; four member states Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia announced the creation of a Monetary Council, as a step toward establishing a 
single currency, joint central bank and a unified economic policy. Nevertheless, Oman 
and the UAE did not sign the Statute and withdrew from the single currency proposal- to 
be called Khaliji (Digital Library of the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States). 
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Despite the fact that the GCC was born in the regional tension, the Charter did not 
mention security issues, it rather focused on questions of economic integration.  
In light of the above discussion, there remains a vast difference in the depth of integration 
in each community. Yet they both seem to have emerged from security concerns and 
developed to encompass and achieve economic integration. The GCC still has a long way 
to go in terms of integration, specifically economic integration.  The EU on the other 
hand has moved beyond economic unity, yet they are still stuck in further enlargement 
and in relinquishing independent foreign policies for a unified EU foreign policy.  
The next chapter will evaluate the rise of interregionalism; which was a direct 
consequence of the rise of new regionalism/open regionalism; as well as interregional 
relations between the EU and the GCC. These interregional relations have had a special 
focus on trade and trade related factors which the fourth chapter will discuss.  
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CHAPTER THREE:   
Interregionalism and the EU-GCC Interregional 
Relation 
3.1 Introduction 
As represented in the previous chapter on regionalism, the development and process of 
change that regionalism went through gave rise to new forms of connections within 
regions and with the outside world. New regionalism therefore dictates that regional 
groupings pay more attention to their external policies and develop partnerships with the 
other regional blocs. These dense networks of interregional relations were also largely 
created through the forces of globalization and the rise of new regionalism that further 
enforced the need to be more connected with others.  
In light of such advancements, this chapter will build upon the theoretical base of the 
previous chapter. It will be divided into several sections; first it will address theory and 
discuss the emergence of interregionalism and its aims. Second, it will look over the 
history of interregional relations between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, and delve into more details on the different kinds of cooperation with a special 
focus on interregional trade and investments between the two blocs. The reasons behind 
focus on trade will be further explained as the chapter develops.  
3.2 Interregionalism 
The study of interregionalism is still a growing field and is only explored by a closed 
group of political economists. This Phenomenon has proven its survival in the 
international political order and therefore will continue to develop as interregional 
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relations between blocs expand. Jürgen Ruland and Heiner Hanggi were among the first 
scholars to explore this emerging phenomenon during the early 2000’s7 . Hanggi defined 
Interregionalism as the linkages built between regions that are based on regular summits 
and ministerial meetings as well as a number of joint projects (2000). 
Interregionalism is manifested along three arrays: relations between regional groupings, 
bioregional and trans-regional relations, and hybrid relations such as relations between 
grouping and single powers (Hanggi, 2000). While all three arrays fall under 
interregionalism, the thesis takes interregionalism to specifically signify relations 
between regional groupings. This also helps to lay the grounds for the discussion to come 
on the interregional relations between the two blocs: the European Union and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council. 
3.2.1 History of Interregionalism 
At the outset, it’s important to understand that regionalism and interregionalism are 
highly euro-centric phenomena that developed simultaneously within the European 
Community (EC), and then were transmitted to other parts of the world. Interregionalism, 
like regionalism emerged over two phases: the first was under closed regionalism and the 
second was under open regionalism. Under closed regionalism and as mentioned in the 
chapter above, the European Economic Community was the pioneer in regional 
integration. 
                                                 
7
 In 1999 Jürgen Ruland published The EU as an interregional actor: The Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
and in 2000 Heiner Hanggi published the paper Interregionalism: Empirical and theoretical perspectives. 
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Following this, Interregionalism and the first interregional agreement, called the Yaoundé 
Convention, took place in 1963 between the European Community and the Association of 
African States and Madagascar (EAMA). The EC-centered interregionalism that emerged 
was not witnessed anywhere around the world. On the contrary, during that era, states 
were pursuing nationalist plans that further enhanced their sovereignty
8
 (Doidge, 2011). 
From the beginning of the formation of European Economic Community, a common 
European voice towards the external world was perceived as necessary for the 
reinforcement of a European identity. With the founding of the European Community 
under the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the treaty accorded the community with external 
competencies that expanded the nature of policy areas over which it had authority. 
Several articles had direct and indirect implications on relations with other countries or 
groups. First was the attribution of several articles and even a section that discussed and 
encouraged agricultural trade and development with the outside world.
9
 
Second was the creation of a common market under article 3(b) of the Treaty. This 
necessitated the establishment of a common custom tariff and therefore resulted in a 
common commercial policy towards third countries, creating the need to form association 
agreements with third countries and organizations. Finally, Articles 238 of the same 
treaty accorded the European Community with the ability to “… conclude with a third 
State, a union of States or an international organization agreement establishing an 
association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special 
procedures” (Treaty of Rome, 1957). 
                                                 
8
 Further explained in chapter 2.  
9
 Agriculture is discussed in the Treaty of Rome under Article 3(d) and in a section dedicated to 
Agriculture called ‘TITTLE 2’ including Article 38 to Article 47. 
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Along with the external implications of creating a common market, the European 
Community found that external relations with the outside world were forced upon it. The 
colonial relations that existed historically between the European states and the outside 
world made these external relations easier to form. This desire and need to create 
relations with the outside was also evident under the Rome Treaty in article 3(k) that 
accorded association with other countries in order to increase trade and promote joint 
economic and social development.  
Article 3(k) is central to this thesis as it accords the European Community the right to 
form relations with other actors based on trade and economic interests. As will be 
explained in this chapter, the early phases of the interregional relations between the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and the European Union were pre-occupied on economic and trade 
issues. As The European integration process developed, the EU’s external relations were 
becoming more firmly entrenched in the global system. Europe’s presence was 
increasingly felt on the international arena. 
The second phase of interregionalism; new interregionalism; emerged following the 
establishment of open regionalism as a phenomenon in the world order. As described by 
Mathew Doidge in his book The European Union and Interregionalism (2011), 
triadisation
10
 resulted in the deepening of regionalism firstly within Europe and then with 
the rest of the world. With the deepening of interregionalism within the three main 
triads−The EU, the United States and East Asia − interregionalism became an important 
and necessary to institutionalize the links between these regions.  
                                                 
10
 Triadisation is also known as globalization. Triadisation as a term developed because globalization in its 
early phases was largely restricted to three areas: North America, the European Union and East Asia. The 
rest of the world was less affected by this Phenomenon. (Doidge,  2011) 
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3.2.2 Interregionalism and Theories of International Relations  
In the realm of international relations, clearly, regionalism as a phenomenon has been 
studied in international relations through the perspective of different schools or traditions. 
Realism and liberal institutionalism have addressed at some length the origins and 
limitations of regionalism. Realist and liberal institutionalist approaches have dominated 
the study of interregionalism and international relations theories had to grapple the latter 
phenomena. 
While states remain the main actors in the international system, the nature of international 
relations has changed since the rise of globalization. The multi-layered system that 
emerged from globalization constitutes a web of complex interdependent relationships 
that connect different actors possessing different capacities. The international system 
functions on different nation states feeding their own rules and regulations through 
regional organizations. The nation states remain the bases of the international system yet 
a new form of relations is starting to develop on the regional level. 
The rise of the neo-liberal globalized world has affected the functioning of the state 
system in the global context. According to Polanyi’s double movement theory, 
globalization has worked in two opposing ways. On the one hand the global world 
became more connected and interdependent, and on the other hand states were isolated 
and felt the ever-growing need to protect their autonomy. Following this and under the 
realist school, interregionalism developed as a coping mechanism and security measure 
for states due to the forces globalization. Security concerns brought about by 
globalization have caused states to realize the need to cooperate of issues of security. 
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This was not only through security threats of direct military conflicts but also through 
conflict arising from economic issues. Thus, the interregional relations ended up 
developing around economic cooperation. (Doidge, 2011) 
The forces of globalization have had major impact on the development of regions and 
interregionalism. Interregionalism has become a significant tool in the external relations 
of states. After the rise of triadisation, interregionalism played an important role in 
integrating states into the global system. As identified by the liberal Institutionalist 
school, the forces of triadisation (or globalization) led to the institutionalizing of relations 
between regions, therefore giving smaller states the unprecedented influence over 
regional and international decision making. This also allowed the stronger states the 
chance to expand their economic and political spheres of influence via regional and 
interregional relations. (Doidge, 2011) 
According to the literature published, Interregionalism has developed several functions, 
each with a specific purpose, but all winding up for the good of the nation-state. Several 
interregional theorists such as Doidge, Hanggi, Gilson and Ruland, explored these 
functions. The functions of interregionalism are now easily distinguished in the Literature 
and are largely influenced by the realist and liberal Institutionalist schools (Doidge, 
2011). 
According to Jürgen Ruland in his chapter ‘Interregionalism: an unfinished agenda’ 
(2006), five functions of interregionalism are identified: balancing and bandwagoning, 
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institution building, rationalizing, agenda-setting and collective identity building.
11
 While 
these functions are theoretically deduced, they are not necessarily empirically real. These 
functions are the result of the diverse combination of international relations theories such 
as neo-realist, Institutionalist and constructivist theories compiled over time. 
The first function of interregionalism, balancing, is deduced from the realist conception 
of competition between states. Interregionalism is viewed as a device for states to balance 
against or maintain the dynamics of the triad. Balancing can take two forms: power 
balancing in case the relationships have a military dimension, or institutional balancing 
when there are disequilibria between regions. Trends in interregionalism have shown that 
institutional balancing takes place more than often between blocs. The reason behind that 
is traced back to the growing role of economics and the decrease in the relevance of 
military confrontations.  
Interregionalism among triadic states could be identified as a concert of regions, while 
interregionalism among non-triadic regions is instrumental in their inclusion and 
adjustment to the changing nature of power politics. Something often ignored by 
literature is that interregionalism is also used as a method of exporting ideas and values. 
The European Union has been an instrumental interregional actor in exporting its values, 
while at the same time functioning as the trigger source for balancing actions among 
other blocs. 
The second function identified by Ruland is the most straight-forward function of 
interregionalism, and it is Institution-building. Institution building function is attributed 
                                                 
11
 The same functions were defined by Mathew Doidge Chapter 2 of his book The European Union and 
Interregionalism.  
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to the liberal Institutionalist school. Under this function, Interregionalism encourages the 
establishment of rules, norms and decision making procedures that shape the interests, 
behavior and expectations of actors. Following this, interregionalism sets out to 
institutionalize international relations among actors (Doidge, 2011). 
Interregional relations consequently lead to the establishment of cooperative structure 
that enhances dialogue. Dialogue structures therefore exist as a result of interregional 
agreements to cooperate on a specific issue. This in turn leads to the creation of fixed 
institutions such as secretariats or representative missions that ensure the enactment of 
rules and regulations. While it is generally the case that liberal institutionalists 
overemphasize the importance of this function, a new form of institution-building has 
emerged called soft institutionalism. Under soft institutionalism countries opt for shallow 
institutionalization of interregional dialogues.  
The third and fourth functions of interregionalism are rationalization and agenda setting. 
With the growing size and complexity of the international order, institutions had to come 
up with techniques in order to stay integrated in policy making. Rationalization and 
agenda setting are the functions of most interest to the actors for they ensure inclusivity 
in the international order. “Interregionalism is seen as a means to overcome the 
difficulties inherent within the global multilateral negotiations (rationalizing) and as a 
means for pursuing cooperative agendas at the global level (agenda setting)” (Doidge, 
2011, p. 38). 
The growing number of actors with diverse interests has led to reduced efficiency of the 
international forums as well as a slower decision making process. Regionalism and 
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interregionalism therefore function by dividing global issues to their respective areas, and 
starting a bottom-up process from the regional to the global level. Agenda setting is 
closely related to rationalization, because following rationalization actors put forward 
policies, recommendations and themes to advance them onto the global forum.  
The fifth and final function of Interregionalism is collective identity building. Recent 
studies suggest that interregional dialogue leads to the formation of a collective identity. 
This is also commonly known as “Regionalism through Interregionalism”. It functions in 
two ways: First, it reflects previous interactions of a region with another region, which in 
turn forms a mental representation about the other region’s self-identity, shape, role and 
interests. Second, it creates a sharp difference between the self and the other, therefore 
creating regional solidarity among one group in order to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness of the group’s actions. (Doidge, 2011) 
While these five functions, according to Ruland, are not technically evident, they could 
still be used as a framework to evaluate interregionalism. As noted above, 
interregionalism and regionalism remain highly connected and they function by 
complementing each other. The five functions of interregionalism mentioned above are 
comprehensive of the literature present on functions of interregionalism. In the section 
below, interregionalism between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
will be evaluated against the five functions (Hanggi, Roloff & Ruland, 2006). 
3.3 History of EU-GCC Interregional Relations 
 
The first interregional agreement between the European Community and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council entered into force on the 20th of February 1989. While this 
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relationship has developed since the early 90’s, it still portrays weak signs of 
interregionalism that is focused around economic interests. The timeline of 
interregionalism between the two blocs as well as the reasons behind the weak 
interregional relations will be further explored. 
Luciani and Schumacher (2004) argue that interregionalism between the EU and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council had been part of a greater European initiative to connect to Western 
Asia. This had precedents in the Euro-Arab Dialogue initiated by the European 
Community during the early 1970’s. The dialogue was the first group-to-group dialogue 
with this region of the world; It was also the European experiment on collective 
diplomacy with other state groupings. The authors stress that these relations were a 
reactive action from the European Economic Community back then (Luciani & 
Schumacher, 2004). 
The Euro-Arab Dialogue was established in March 1974 but only in the backdrop of 
several factors that forced the EEC to engage with this part of the world. First and 
foremost, the OAPEC countries placed the oil embargo on the European Community. 
While this embargo was selective in nature, it targeted almost all nine member states and 
reminded the EEC of their dependence on oil in this region
12
. Coupled with the oil 
embargo was the global oil crisis of 1973/4, when the OPEC states decided to quadruple 
oil prices and place an embargo on the United States (Taylor, 1978). 
Along with the ongoing economic factors at the time pushing for greater cooperation, a 
political factor also played a role in the formation of this dialogue, and that was the Arab-
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 During that period, 1973, the EC constituted 9 members: Britain, Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland. 
41 
 
Israeli conflict. While the European Community was divided in its views on the Arab-
Israeli conflict, it was still perceived as having an anti-Arab stance. A surprising message 
delivery by the Arab league to the EEC in one of their ministerial meetings in 1973, 
asked them to adopt a more balanced position in the Arab-Israeli conflict – a more pro-
Arab stance. This came as a shock to the EC and highlighted the need to establish closer 
relations with the region (Koch et al., 2005). 
Needless to say, the Euro-Arab Dialogue was not successful in implementing any 
substantial policies or projects. It also coincided with other European initiatives like the 
Global Mediterranean Policy and the EU-GCC Cooperation Agreement, but there was no 
coordination between these projects and no common policy guiding them even though 
they targeted the same region of the world. The failure of the Euro-Arab dialogue and the 
European decision to deal with Western Asia along two separate projects, led to the 
emergence of the EU-GCC interregional relations.
13
 
Following the formation of the GCC in 1981
14
 and the failure of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, 
The GCC council and the European Community arranged for a joint ministerial meeting 
in 1985. The following meetings were positive and included mutual agreement on 
cooperation in political and economic issues. The GCC was eager for a cooperation 
agreement that will allow them close association with the European community and 
preferential trade concession.  
                                                 
13
 For detailed analysis of these developments see Koch, C., Szajkowsji, B., Merdad, J., Baabood, A., 
Neugart, F. & Gause, F.G. (2005) Unfulfilled Potential: Exploring the GCC-EU Relationship. United Arab 
Emirates: Gulf Research Center. 
14
 It is important to note that the GCC as mentioned earlier in chapter 2 was emulating the European Model 
of regional cooperation, and was therefore eager to conclude closer relations with the European Economic 
Community.  
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A subsequent meeting was held in 1987 and both sides were quick to agree on common 
interests in sectors of energy, investment, industrial cooperation, technology and 
training.
15
 1978 marked the year of momentum where several meetings were held 
between the two blocs and an agreement was reached. On 8
th
 of October 1978, the 
Commission sent the Council a draft Decision that would authorize it to negotiate a 
cooperation agreement with the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
 The Council had an initial exchange of views on the proposal on October 20
th
, and 
agreed to look at it again on November 23
rd
 (EC Bulletin 10-1987, 1987). On November 
23
rd 
1987, the directives were approved and the commission initiated negotiations. In 
March 1988 an agreement was reached formally and it was signed on June 15
th
 1988 
between the member states of the GCC and EC representatives. The following 
Cooperation agreement between the two blocs did not come into force until the 20
th
 of 
February 1989, and that was due to the extensive process outlined in article 235 
(mentioned above) that mandates ratification by both parties (Luciani & Schumacher, 
2004). 
The European Community Bulletin No.3 of 1989 outlines the agreement, and it states 
that: 
“The Agreement provides for cooperation in the following fields: economic 
affairs, agriculture and fisheries, industry, energy, science, technology, 
investment, the environment and trade. 
 As regards economic cooperation the two sides will seek to facilitate the transfer 
of technology through joint ventures and to encourage cooperation on standards. 
In the case of energy, both sides will promote cooperation between firms, training 
                                                 
15
 The GCC was asking for preferential trade agreements similar to those concluded between the EEC and 
Isreal/ Mashreq and Maghreb. Yogoslavia.  
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and joint studies on trade in oil, gas and pet-roleum products. They will also 
endeavor to promote appropriate investment protec-tion and a reciprocal 
improvement of investment conditions. In the trade sector the aim of cooperation 
will be to encourage expansion and diversification. Both sides will also continue 
to accord each other most-favored-nation treatment.  
In order to ensure that the cooperation measures are given practical application a 
Joint Council will be set up which will meet at least once a year, or at the request 
of one of the parties.  
Both sides also agreed to promote measures in the framework of the Uruguay 
Round7 designed to bring about a multilateral reduction of the customs duties 
applicable to petrochemical products.  
Once the Agreement is signed — this is planned for June — the two sides have 
agreed to begin discussing a second agreement, the aim of which will be to 
improve access for exports to their respective mar-kets and liberalize mutual 
trade, provided both parties can find solutions for their sensitive sectors” 
(European Community Bulletin No.3, 1989). 
As noticed above, the text makes reference to trade and specifically oil trade between the 
two blocs, which again highlights the concerns and focuses on trade between the two 
regions. Another reference was made to the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement 
between the two blocs, which is often perceived as the main driver behind the 
establishment of these relations. Twenty-five years after the Cooperation Agreement, 
interregional relations have developed between the two blocs but the FTA has not 
formed.  
The Cooperation Agreement (CA) that took place in 1989 remains the sole framework 
upon which the EU-GCC interregional relations function. While a Joint Action 
Programme 2010-2013 was created in 2010, aiming for closer cooperation between the 
EU and the GCC on several issues, the Programme was not renewed. Trade between the 
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two regions remains the driver for cooperation. The details of the Cooperation Agreement 
and the Joint Action Programme will be further discussed below. 
3.3.1 The Cooperation Agreement: Economic Cooperation and the Free Trade 
Agreement 
Two decades of interregional cooperation between the European Union and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council were dictated by a few pages that outline cooperation areas along 
with annual ministerial meetings that were held regularly. The document, as will be 
evident, has an economic focus and did not address any form of political cooperation. 
Luciani and Schumacher indicate that this is because the European Community had 
already tried its hand with collective diplomacy in this region of the world but was not 
successful, thus opting for mere economic interregional relations (2004). 
The Cooperation Agreement included a Preamble and 26 articles divided into four 
sections: General objectives, Economic cooperation, Trade, and General and Final 
Provisions. The CA was meant to institutionalize the relations between the two blocs. 
That is evident in the text of the agreement because the articles remained mainly vague; 
keeping the venue open for further levels of cooperation agreed upon in the ministerial 
meetings. The preamble on the other hand indicates that cooperation among the equal 
partners is to be extended to all spheres including those of security and stability. It also 
has a wider aim to contribute to the development of the global economy and energy 
spheres (EU-GCC cooperation Agreement, 1989). 
The first article and the General Objectives of the Cooperation Agreement of 1989 are the 
following: (1) Strengthening the relations between the two blocs through 
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institutionalizing the relationship. (2) The broadening and consolidation of relations in 
energy, industry, trade and services, agriculture, fisheries, investment, science, 
technology and environment. (3) Strengthening the process of economic development of 
the GCC countries in order to ensure peace and stability in the region. As mentioned 
above, the general objectives reflect the lines along which this CA was established: 
institutionalizing relations, broadening economic cooperation and ensuring political 
stability. 
Under Economic Cooperation, the CA dedicates nine articles for greater cooperation in 
economy, agriculture, industry, energy, investments, science and technology and 
environment. These articles focused on the importance of exchange of information and 
building capacities in order to produce such information. While it is implicit in some of 
the articles under economic cooperation, Trade still receives a special section dedicated 
to its discussion, under Article 11
16
. The General and Final Provisions establish the 
framework the joint council/ministerial meetings between the EU and the GCC foreign 
ministers, and for joint cooperation committees at the senior officials' level (EU-GCC 
Cooperation Agreement, 1989). 
Following the entry into force of the Cooperation Agreement in 1989, the first joint 
ministerial council session was held on the 17
th
 of March 1990 in Muscat. After each 
annual meeting, a joint communique is published outlining the headlines of issues 
discussed, yet these communiqués ended up being statements on regional political events 
concerning Iraq and Iran mostly, terrorism and piracy acts. The negotiations for the FTA 
were first initiated in the ministerial meeting of 1990 and then renewed in 1991.  In 1995 
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 The following article will be discussed in the subsection ‘Trade’ below. 
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and following low levels of activity between the two regions, a dialogue on security 
issues and a strengthened political dialogue were established.  
During the 1990’s, the European Union did not engage with the GCC as an actor of 
political relevance, but rather used the CA as a tool to secure access to gulf markets 
(Koch, 2014). Ten years later, during the ministerial meeting held in 2001, it was agreed 
that “trade, investment and cooperation constituted the foundation of the EU-GCC 
relations” (Joint Communiqué, 2001), and therefore negotiations for an FTA were 
renewed. During the same year the European Council approved the updated negotiating 
directives, a framework was set up and the EU-GCC Joint Council resumed negotiations 
on the basis of that framework (FTA SIA Terms of Reference, 2002). 
The EU and the GCC continued to meet annually but several factors have stalled the FTA 
process. Initially the FTA could not be agreed upon since the GCC did not establish a 
Custom Union. That is because trade with the individual countries that are part of the 
GCC would have been diverted away from states with higher tariffs to states with lower 
ones. Nevertheless, this barrier was removed when the GCC was able to agree on a 
common external tariff. This process took some time due to the GCC’s less advanced 
integration process, but a custom union came into effect on the 1
st
 of January 2003 and 
the pace of negotiations picked up.  
The GCC custom union allowed space for the FTA to include clauses on not only 
exchange of goods but also on exchange of services, government procurement, and 
intellectual property rights. Nevertheless, The GCC was hesitant to meet the EU’s 
demands on liberalizing trade of government procurement, which resulted in the 
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suspension of negotiations on the FTA by the GCC members in 2008.  Regardless, 
informal negotiations are still taking place, and since 2013 there has been an ever-
growing push from the GCC to reach an agreement. One thing remains however, and  
that is that the FTA does not have a timeline and has therefore stretched out over the past 
25 years with little advancements (Kostadinova, 2013). 
From the outset there existed several problems with the negotiations on the FTA between 
the two blocs. One of which was the strong petrochemical lobby in the EU that pushed 
for high tariffs on petrochemicals imported from the GCC in order to protect their own 
petrochemical industries. This was highly opposed by the GCC since the early 
negotiations of the FTA because they perceived it as a direct threat to their ‘infant’ 
petrochemical industry. Yet, according to EU officials, the GCC is subsidizing its energy 
sector by double-pricing petrochemicals and receiving 30% lower rates on imports 
(Ayadi & Gadi, 2013). 
The Carbon Tax first initiated in the late 1990’s by the European Union imposed taxes on   
products with high carbon content. In its early phases, this law taxed energy content 
rather than carbon content. Since 2009 the carbon tax was modified to tax the content of 
carbon and energy equally, and it averages at €15/ton. Nevertheless, this tax was not 
agreed upon by all 27 EU members and was adopted only by a handful of EU members. 
This imposed tax increased the price of imported goods from the Gulf, especially 
petrochemicals, and those represented the majority of gulf exports to the EU (Anderson, 
2010). 
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In 2005, the EU launched the Emission Trading System (ETS) in three phases
17
, and 
currently we are in the third phase which started in 2013 and spans till 2020.  Part of this 
carbon tax implementation was a carbon tax implemented on the aviation sector that 
received high rejection from aviation companies in the Gulf (The National News, 2011). 
While this carbon tax was supposed to come into effect in 2012, and given its wide 
rejection by aviation companies, the European Parliament developed a market based 
scheme and postponed its launching till 2020 (European Commission Website, 2014). 
Another impediment is the EU’s adherence to values on freedom, democracy and human 
rights that were largely not accepted on the GCC’s side. The FTA included clauses on 
human rights and illegal migration that were rejected by the GCC states because they 
claimed that human rights issues had nothing to do with trade liberalization. Given the 
different norms and values of these institutions, there are still ongoing negotiations on 
some of these clauses. Some EU officials state that the “Human Rights Clause” is used as 
just an excuse for the GCC’s reluctance to let go of the petrochemical subsidy (Ayadi & 
Gadi, 2013). 
After a careful review of the Joint Communiqués published since the early 2000’s, it is 
obvious that 2008 marked a shift in negotiations. The statement issued on the Free trade 
agreement in 2008 was the following:  “The Joint Council reviewed the progress made on 
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 The first two phases were initiated in 2005-2007 and 2008- 2012.  These phases were set a national level 
through the national allocation plan. The first phase covered the CO2 emissions from power generators and 
energy-intensive industrial sectors.  Phase one succeeded in establishing a price for carbon, free trade in 
emission allowances across the EU and the necessary infrastructure for monitoring, reporting and verifying 
actual emissions from the businesses covered. Under Phase two Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway joined 
the EU ETS. At the same time, the scope of the system was marginally widened through the inclusion of 
nitrous oxide emissions from the production of nitric acid by a number of Member States. Phase three was 
initiated in 2013 and it aimed at implementing a single EU wide-cap on emissions. Thus far, the EU was 
able to cover almost half of its emissions. (Climate Actions, 2014) 
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the negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement and noted that the parties are getting closer. 
They encouraged negotiators from both sides to further intensify their efforts to reach a 
mutually agreed text before the end of July 2008 and undertake to prepare the agreement 
for initialing before the end of 2008” (Joint Communique 2008, 2008, p. 4). As evident 
from the communique, the two blocs were very close to concluding the agreement and 
even had a date set for conclusion.  
Nevertheless, the reasons discussed above caused the stalling and even complete 
suspension of these negotiations on the formal level. That was also reflected in Joint 
Communiqués published after 2008, where the only mention of the FTA was in 2009 
asserting the continuation of the negotiations. Over the past three years the FTA has not 
been discussed in the ministerial meetings; Some attribute this to the economic crisis that 
the EU was going through which in turn stalled all external negotiations (Kostadinova, 
2013). 
 The latest Ministerial meeting was held in Manama, Bahrain between representatives of 
the EU and the GCC on the 30
th
 of June 2013. During this meeting the FTA was not 
discussed at all. The ministerial meetings while producing some advancement in specific 
fields such as education and cultural exchange, they have not been able to cause any 
substantial enhancement in these relations. A news post by the National Newspaper in the 
Gulf in July 2013 stated that the GCC will raise the stakes for concluding the FTA by not 
signing off the renewal of the Joint Action Programme. (The National, 2013) 
This comes against the backdrop of a statement by the Bahraini foreign minister stating 
that “almost 99 per cent of the items have being agreed and only one issue related to 
50 
 
export duties is currently being reviewed before any decision is reached” (Trade Arabia 
News Services, 2013). Several months have passed since the conclusion of the Joint 
Action Programme, which was not renewed at the expense of a Free Trade Agreement 
that is still not concluded. The next ministerial meeting is to be held in the next couple of 
months, and the fate of the FTA is yet to be determined. 
3.3.2 The Joint Action Programme (JPA) 
The ties between the GCC and the EU have slowly developed over the past years on 
multi-faceted arenas. The EU deployed a delegation in Saudi Arabia for the five GCC 
countries - Bahrain, KSA, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar in 2004, while a second EU 
Delegation was deployed in the United Arab Emirates in 2013. (European Union External 
Action website, 2014) 
 Along with the ministerial meetings being held annually, non-official projects were been 
set up in areas such as clean energy, diplomacy, science and technology and larger 
political dialogue.  Part of these advancements was the Joint Action Programme (JAP) 
(Koch, 2014).  The GCC and the EU agreed on initiating a Joint Action Programme in 
2010 that spanned three years (2010-2013), as part of the implementation of the 
Cooperation Agreement.  
The JAP set out a roadmap for closer cooperation on economic, financial and monetary 
issues, investments, trade cooperation, nuclear safety, clean energy, research, 
environment, information and communication technology, and education (Joint Action 
Programme, 2010). The document includes fourteen clauses that primarily have 
economic and educational foci. Some of the projects that were implemented were the Al-
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Jisr,
18
 INCO-NET- GCC
19
 and the ERASMUS MUNDUS for the Gulf.
20
 These projects 
that spanned from 2010 till 2013 aimed at improving public diplomacy, bi-regional 
dialogue and student exchange programs (Koch, 2014). 
Some officials viewed the Joint Action Programme as a replacement for the FTA. 
Unfortunately this Programme was not renewed in 2013 due to a decision by the GCC to 
not continue with the Programme until agreement on the FTA was reached. Following the 
suspension of the JAP in 2013, The Cooperation Agreement of 1989 still remains the 
framework for improving the relations between the two blocs on both political and 
economic issues.  
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 The Al-Jisr Project is a project that started in July 2008 and was concluded in 2010. Al-Jisr is an EU-
GCC Public Diplomacy and Outreach Activities project that aimed for enhancing public knowledge of the 
EU and contribute to EU-GCC policy making. For more information visit the Al-Jisr website 
http://www.aljisr.ae/ 
19
  INCO-NET is an EU initiative aimed at enhancing bilateral relations with other regions. It was initiated 
in 2010 and ended in 2013. The project aimed at promoting regional interaction for the identification and 
prioritization of common research. For more information, visit the INCONET-GCC website 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/inco-net_gcc_110913.pdf#view=fit&pagemode=none 
20
 The Erasmus Mundus Gulf Countries Programme is a Partnership between 12 Universities from Europe 
and the Gulf Countries and an Institution from the Gulf, focusing on promoting educational interchanges 
between 2 differentiated geographical regions through a comprehensive scholarship awards scheme. For 
more information visit the Erasmus Mundus for the Gulf website http://emgulf.eu/ 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Trade and Politics of Interregionalism 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters discussed the theories of regionalism and interregionalism in an 
attempt to understand the interregional relationship between the EU and the GCC. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, the EU-GCC interregional relation remains relatively 
weak and highly economic in nature. Economics and trade have taken the forefront in 
these relations, yet with little to no advancements. Political cooperation on the other hand 
was not structured into the relationship; such cooperation evolved despite the lack of 
consensus on the Free Trade Agreement. 
Economic activity- specifically trade and investment- took center stage in the agreements 
between the EU and the GCC. The Cooperation Agreement remains the sole framework 
upon which these relations function, even the JPA is under the framework of the 
Cooperation Agreement. Given the very economic focus of the texts of both the CA and 
the JPA, this chapter will discuss the economic relations of the two blocs in terms of 
trade and investments.  
Against the backdrop of weak agreement on economic issues, the joint council meetings 
became the venue for the EU and the GCC to develop their political cooperation. The 
Joint council meetings were used to express political positions on developments in the 
region and around the world. The common interests of these two blocs were further 
developed beyond mere economic cooperation and stemmed into the field of politics. 
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This chapter is divided into two sections; the first section will discuss the economic 
relation between the two blocs while the second section will look at areas of common 
political cooperation. This will allow us to look at trade and what lies beyond trade, in 
order to better understand the dynamics of the relationship.  
4.2 Economic Relations between the EU and the GCC 
Dialogue under the Cooperation Agreement seems to have failed in producing substantial 
change, yet the two blocs continue to trade and invest in each other’s economies to take 
place. The EU- GCC interregional relationship despite its problems has helped the GCC 
states to prosper through exporting oil and gas to the EU. Despite fluctuation on oil 
prices, the relationship in the long hold provided GCC countries with substantial income, 
which is partly used for development projects in the Gulf. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter and in several statements made by EU and GCC officials it was acknowledged 
that investments and trade remain the bases upon which these blocs interact.  
This chapter focuses on trade relations because interregionalism between the two blocs 
has been designed around issues of trade. Trade continues to be the main avenue upon 
which the interregional relations between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council function. Yet this chapter also argues that these trade relations constitute a small 
share of the international trade with other countries, which is possibly the reason why 
these relations have not been a priority for both blocs.  
The importance of reaching a Free Trade Agreement between these two blocs has largely 
affected how these relations have developed. From its inception, trade was central to this 
relationship. Article 11 of the Cooperation Agreement of 1989 states that: 
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 1. In the field of trade, the objective of this Agreement is to promote the 
development and diversification of the reciprocal commercial exchanges between 
the Contracting Parties to the highest possible level, inter alia by studying ways 
and means of overcoming trade barriers for the access of each Contracting Party's 
products to the other Contracting Party's market. 
2. The Contracting Parties shall enter into discussions concerning the negotiation 
of an agreement aimed at the expansion of trade in accordance with the provisions 
of the Joint Declaration annexed hereto. 
3. Pending the conclusion of the trade agreement referred to in paragraph 2, the 
Contracting Parties accord each other most-favored-nation treatment. 
While this article sets out the bases of future trade relations between the two blocs, it also 
asserts that the Cooperation Agreement is only a first step towards the larger aim of 
having a Free Trade Agreement between the two blocs. Despite the centrality of trade and 
economic issues in the 1989 Cooperation Agreement, subsequent Joint Communiques 
emanating from EU-GCC Ministerial meetings focused on political rather than trade and 
economic issues. This shift in focus is partly due to the inability of the two sides to 
upgrade their economic and trade relationship to the states of a Free Trade Agreement. 
The Joint Action Programme of 2010 also determined an article focused on trade in order 
to increase bilateral GCC-EU trade. Article 3 of JAP 2010-2013 encouraged the 
following: (1) The exchange of trade delegations, (2) The scheduling of trade exhibitions 
organized, (3) Continuation of current “GCC day” and “EU day”, (4) Organizing of 
workshops and forums on economic issues, (5) The exchange views on the topics to be 
examined at the WTO, (6) The establishment of a regular dialogue on issues having an 
impact on the access to the EU and GCC markets, and (7) Facilitating the increase of EU-
GCC trade flows,  through the removal of non-tariff barriers (Joint Action Programme, 
2010). 
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The EU Parliament dedicated a session in 2011 to discuss the relations with the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, and they adopted a resolution. Resolution (2010/2233(INI) pointed 
out to the importance of the Gulf region a global economic hub and its role as the fifth 
largest export market to the EU. Trade in goods, trade in services, foreign direct 
investments (FDI) and sovereign wealth funds constitute the bases upon which these two 
blocs interact economically.  
4.2.1 Trade 
In a study published recently by Sharaka in October 2013, trade and investment flows 
between the two blocs were evaluated and a shift away from trade with the EU towards 
the BRICs was noted
21
. This shift in trade was noted in earlier publications by think tanks 
in the GCC. Rodney Wilson’s publications on the Changing Composition and Direction 
of Trade (1998) as well as The Gulf-EU trade Relationship (2002) both speak about the 
decrease in relations with the European Union due to the rise of Asian economies that 
were stronger, closer, and growing more in need of the resources of the gulf. 
 In other words, Asian economies such as Japan and China came to replace Europe in 
terms of trade relations with the GCC. While European trade with the Gulf Cooperation 
Council remained present, it was focused mainly on energy and petrochemicals (Wilson, 
2002). This diversion of trade was even more highlighted in the Sharaka Study stating 
that the GCC exports to the BRICs grew by 21% compared to the growth rate of 12 % to 
the EU. According to the authors, the shift is due to the financial crisis that hit Europe 
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 Sharaka is an institute born out of the Joint Action Programme of 2010 but was officially launched in 
2012. It is an institute implemented by five organizations from Europe and the Gulf. The two year project 
aims at researching ways in which the EU- GCC relationship could be developed. It is cofounded by the 
EU and the GCC. For more information visit the official Sharaka website www. sharaka.eu. 
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and decreased demand for hydrocarbons, while demand increased in the BRICs due to 
their relative unaffectedness from the crisis (Ayadi & Gadi, 2013). 
When looking at the major international trading partners of the GCC, it is clear that 
China, The United States, and Germany are in the lead. On the other hand when looking 
at regional blocs, the European Union and ASEAN are the GCC’s main trading patterns 
according to the World Trade Report of 2013. The table below ranks the world’s major 
trading powers based on their respective shares in international trade.  
Table 1: Leading Exporters and Importers in World Merchandise Trade, 2012 
(Billion dollars and percentage) 
Rank Exporters Value Share 
Annual 
percenta
ge 
Change(
2011-
2012) 
Ran
k 
Importers Value Share 
Annua
l 
percen
tage 
change 
(2011-
2012)        1  China  2049  11.1  8  1  United States  2336  12.6  3   
       2  United States  1546  8.4  4  2  China  1818  9.8  4   
       3  Germany  1407  7.6  -5  3  Germany  1167  6.3  -7   
       4  Japan  799  4.3  -3  4  Japan  886  4.8  4   
       5  Netherlands  656  3.6  -2  5  United Kingdom  690  3.7  2   
       6  France  569  3.1  -5  6  France  674  3.6  -6   
       7  Korea, Republic of  548  3.0  -1  7  Netherlands  591  3.2  -1   
       8  Russian Federation  529  2.9  1  8  Hong Kong, China  553  3.0  8   
       9  Italy  501  2.7  -4  retained imports  140  0.8  6   
      10  Hong Kong, China  493  2.7  8   
  domestic exports  22  0.1  33  9  Korea, Republic of  520  2.8  -1   
  re-exports  471  2.6  7  10  India  490  2.6  5   
Source: International Trade Statistics 2012.The World Trade Organization. (2013) 
As table 1 shows, four EU members (Germany, Netherlands, France and Italy) are among 
the world’s top ten exporters. While three European countries: Germany, United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands are among the world’s ten leading importers. By contrast 
the leading Arab exporter Saudi Arabia (a GCC member)−  ranks 15th in terms of share of 
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world exports followed by the United Arab Emirates ranking at 17. No other GCC 
country figures among the 50 leading importers and exporters. These figures re-enforce 
the thesis argument that the EU is far more involved in international trade than the GCC. 
While the EU, as aforementioned, is more involved in international trade than the GCC, it 
has been recently facing some problems. In 2012, all 27 EU members saw declines in 
both imports and exports from 2011. These declines in EU trade are attributed to 
uncertainty and structural problems in the Euro area.  
According to the World Trade Report 2013: 
The World trade growth fell to 2.0 per cent in 2012 from 5.2 per cent in 2011, and 
remained sluggish in the opening months of 2013 as the economic slowdown in 
Europe suppressed global import demand. The abrupt deceleration of trade in 
2012 was mainly attributable to slow growth in developed economies and 
recurring bouts of uncertainty over the future of the euro. Flagging output and 
high unemployment in developed countries reduced imports and fed through to a 
lower pace of export growth in both developed and developing economies. 
(World Trade Organization Trade Statistics, 2013) 
Even with this relative decline of international trade, the European Union still takes the 
lead in the total merchandise trade with $5,792 billion worth of exports, and $5,927 
billion worth of imports recorded in the year of 2012. Yet when looking at the annual 
percentage change, exports decreased by 5% and imports by 6% from 2011. Asian 
economies ranked second to the EU in both international imports and exports, yet the 
world in 2012 witnessed sluggish developments in trade due to economic problems in the 
EU (World Trade Report 2013, 2013)
22
. 
                                                 
22
 In the second half of 2012, the European Union tried to reduce their large debts and deficits, and the U.S. 
was negotiating the budget which led to the stagnation of international trade during that period. A 2.1% 
growth in trade was accompanied by similar low growth rates for global output and market exchange rates. 
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When looking at the EU and GCC shares of international trade comparatively, it is clear 
that the EU is a much larger trading partner overall. Even on the international level, the 
EU is the largest importer and exporter of commodities. According to statistics published 
by the European Commission in 2014, the EU is the sixth major exporting market for the 
GCC, and the primary importer into the GCC. In terms of total trade the EU is the largest 
trading partner of the GCC with a share of 12.8% of total GCC trade, yet this percentage 
remains relatively low when compared to trade with other economic blocs. (European 
Union Trade in Goods with GCC, 2014). 
On the other hand, the GCC constitutes only 3.4% of total imports to the EU, while the 
EU’s exports to the GCC constitute only 5.5% of its global exports. Table 2 below shows 
the existence of a definitive trade imbalance between the two blocs. This imbalance is 
dealt with below when looking at the trade flows in each sector. Value wise, EU imports 
and exports from the GCC increased between 2003 and 2011− with a mild decrease in 
2009 due to the financial crisis (European Union Trade in Goods with GCC, 2014). 
Table 2 shows that the value of EU imports from the GCC in 2013 were lower than they 
were in 2011, but the share of extra-EU trade remained the same, which means that total 
trade imports to the EU declined. Nevertheless, in comparison to the trade values of 2003 
– when trade flows were at €20,300 Million- trade values in 2013 are almost triple that 
value at €56,958 Million. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
For further information, refer to the World Trade Report 2013 published by the World Trade Organizations. 
Retrieved from: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report13_e.pdf 
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Table 2: Trade Flows between the EU and GCC from 2003-2013 
  IMPORTS   EXPORTS  
Period 
Value 
(Mio €) 
% growth 
Share in 
Extra-EU 
Value 
(Mio €) 
% growth 
Share in 
extra-EU 
2003 20,300 
 
2.2 37,871 
 
4 
2004 25,592 26.1 2.5 41,386 9.3 4.4 
2005 37,730 47.4 3.2 50,756 22.6 4.8 
2006 35,936 -4.8 2.6 54,624 7.6 4.7 
2007 31,945 -11.1 2.2 61,251 12.1 5 
2008 37,566 17.6 2.4 70,138 14.5 5.4 
2009 22,783 -39.4 1.8 57,841 -17.5 5.3 
2010 35,086 54 2.3 65,491 13.2 4.8 
2011 57,437 63.7 3.3 73,048 11.5 4.7 
2012 61,204 6.6 3.4 83,686 14.6 5 
2013 56,958 -6.9 3.4 95,069 13.6 5.5 
Source: European Union Trade in Good with GCC. European Commission. Directorate 
General for Trade (2014) 
The European Commission statistics as well as statistics published by the Gulf Research 
Center provide ample evidence of the existing gap in the trade between the EU and the 
GCC. Trade flow between the EU and the GCC is concentrated in the direction of the 
GCC. While the EU’s total imports from the GCC in 2013 were €56,958 Million, its 
exports to the GCC were around €95,069 Million. This discrepancy demonstrates the 
existence of significant trade between the two blocs (European Union Trade in Goods 
with GCC, 2014) 
.As represented in Table 3 below, statistics published by the European Commission 
divide the imports and exports between the EU and GCC into sectors. The largest EU 
imports from the GCC are mineral products constituting 75.8% of the total. Another 6.1% 
of EU imports from the GCC came from oil related products namely plastics, rubber and 
similar products. While petroleum represents the EU’s main import from the GCC, it 
only accounts for 8.2% of the total extra-EU trade. 
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Table 3:  Trade flows by HS section 2013                                                                                                                                          
HS Sections 
Value 
Shar
e in 
Impor
ts 
Share 
in 
Growt
h* 
Value 
Share 
in 
Exports 
Share in 
Growth* 
  Total Extra-
EU 
  Total Extra-EU   
(Mio 
€) 
( % ) ( % ) ( % ) (Mio 
€) 
( % ) ( % ) ( % ) 
  TOTAL 56,95
8 
100.0 3.4 -6.9 95,06
9 
100.0 5.5 13.6 
I Live animals; animal products 25 0.0 0.1 -28.1 1,474 1.6 6.1 11.7 
II Vegetable products 21 0.0 0.0 -5.3 2,049 2.2 8.1 43.5 
III Animal or vegetable fats and 
oils 
26 0.0 0.3 -70.9 111 0.1 2.2 6.2 
IV Foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco 45 0.1 0.1 88.7 3,995 4.2 6.3 6.9 
V Mineral products 43,17
8 
75.8 8.2 -11.8 3,643 3.8 2.9 1.5 
VI Products of the chemical or 
allied industries 
2,332 4.1 1.7 -3.8 9,368 9.9 3.9 6.8 
VI
I 
Plastics, rubber and articles 
thereof 
3,499 6.1 7.3 21.7 2,269 2.4 3.5 -0.4 
VI
II 
Raw hides and skins, and 
saddlery 
38 0.1 0.3 1.6 562 0.6 3.5 20.0 
IX Wood, charcoal and cork and 
articles thereof 
5 0.0 0.1 59.5 677 0.7 5.7 0.3 
X Pulp of wood, paper and 
paperboard 
31 0.1 0.2 -2.8 1,159 1.2 4.0 4.5 
XI Textiles and textile articles 210 0.4 0.2 23.0 1,905 2.0 4.6 7.2 
XI
I 
Footwear, hats and other 
headgear 
14 0.0 0.1 30.9 363 0.4 4.2 16.9 
XI
II 
Articles of stone, glass and 
ceramics 
152 0.3 1.5 15.4 1,469 1.5 7.8 2.2 
XI
V 
Pearls, precious metals and 
articles thereof 
2,479 4.4 4.4 -2.8 8,868 9.3 8.4 165.9 
X
V 
Base metals and articles 
thereof 
1,684 3.0 1.9 9.8 5,751 6.0 5.4 6.8 
X
VI 
Machinery and appliances 1,455 2.6 0.4 11.3 28,10
9 
29.6 6.3 -1.3 
X
VI
I 
Transport equipment 1,043 1.8 1.1 182.2 14,78
5 
15.6 5.6 24.7 
X
VI
II 
Optical and photographic 
instruments, etc. 
219 0.4 0.4 3.9 3,586 3.8 4.5 3.0 
XI
X 
Arms and ammunition 2 0.0 0.2 147.6 92 0.1 2.7 -7.8 
X
X 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 
44 0.1 0.1 -8.0 2,184 2.3 7.6 6.7 
X
XI 
Works of art and antiques 21 0.0 0.7 34.6 221 0.2 3.4 123.7 
X
XI
I 
Not classified 433 0.8 2.6 18.4 2,428 2.6 13.0 27.5 
Source: European Union Trade in Good with GCC. European Commission. 
Directorate General for Trade. (2014) 
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Table 3 shows that machinery and appliances represent the largest share of EU exports to 
the GCC (29.6 %), followed by transport equipment (15.6%). Other significant categories 
of items that the EU exports to the GCC include Jewelry items -pearls, precious metals 
and articles thereof- (8.4%) and vegetable products (8.1%).  
The GCC exports to the EU in 2013 accounted to 3.4% of total imports to the EU, while 
the EU exports to the GCC account to 5.5% of total imports to the GCC (European Union 
Trade in Goods with GCC, 2014). This further supports the statement that trade between 
the two blocs represents a small share of their international trade and is more 
concentrated in the direction from the EU to the GCC. The imports from the GCC to the 
EU are most focused on trade of mineral fuels, i.e. petroleum products. The section below 
considers the political implications of the importance of energy in the trade relations 
between the two blocs.  
These figures show that trade between the two blocs is relatively minimal compared to 
trade conducted with other international actors. For example, the total trade between the 
EU and the USA is €484,228 Million and with China is €428,324 Million, which is 
almost four times the total trade between the EU and the GCC, which is at €152,027 
Million. One important distinction to make is that the GCC’s low level of integration is 
also reflected in the statistics published by all entities.  
The latest publication by the Gulf Investment Corporation outlines economic 
performance and external trade statistics of the GCC in the year 2011. The following data 
is produced for each GCC member separately but a pattern is identified from this data: 
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the EU is among the top five trading partners of all GCC states. The table below 
represents the trade balance of each GCC state and then the aggregate for all the member 
states. 
Annex A provides statistical data obtained from the World Trade Organization on the 
trade flows of the individual GCC member states in 2012. This data supports the data 
published by the EU commission and indicates that even though the GCC is not a very 
significant exporter to the EU, the EU is a major trading partner and importer to the GCC. 
The European Union represents a major share of the total imports from the world to the 
GCC, the lowest share is for Qatar at 11.6% and the largest share is for the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia reaching up to 31.9% (GCC Economic Statistics 11
th
 Edition, 2011). 
These trade relations remain highly bilateral and take place among a small group of 
countries within the EU and the GCC- mainly between France, Germany and the UK and 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Even though the EU relations with the 
GCC are conducted on the basis of interregional relations between the two blocs, bi-
lateral trade and relations seems to take the lead. This also is a reason why relations 
between the two interregional blocs have been weak and a possible reason why the FTA 
has not been concluded yet (Ayadi & Gadi, 2013). 
4.2.2 Investment 
There is a close relationship between trade and investments, investments encourage trade 
and major trading partners tend to invest significantly in each other’s economies. 
Increasingly, investment issues are coming under the preview of the WTO (World Bank, 
2003). Investment data much like trade data are not aggregated into the flows of regional 
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groupings but rather exist on individual state investment flows. A study published by EU-
GCC Invest
23
 states that aggregate information on the investments of the EU in the GCC 
has only been recently available and the assessment of these relations is relatively hard 
due to the unavailability of data.  
The EU is an important source of Foreign Direct Investments in the Gulf. The Foreign 
Direct Investments of the EU within the GCC account for a large percentage of the total 
Foreign Direct Investments in the GCC. “The biggest individual investor country by far 
(in the GCC), for those for which data is available, is the United Kingdom, followed by 
France and Italy. Together, they account for over 60% of all EU investments, 51 billion € 
in 2010, which is 1.2% of all extra-European investments” (Bossdorf, Engels & Weiler, 
2013). 
According to a similar study conducted by Ayadi and Gadi called EU-GCC Trade and 
Investment Relations: What Prospect of an FTA between the Two Regions? (2013), 
current investment relations between the EU and the GCC are of a bulky magnitude, 
which makes them account for a large portion of the interregional relations between the 
EU and the GCC. Foreign Direct Investments within the GCC increased significantly 
following the implementation of reform projects to attract foreign investors. It increased 
from €1.6 billion in 2002 and reached over €26 billion in 2012 (Khaleej Times, 2013). 
This increase was also supplemented by Saudi Arabia’s accession to the WTO in 2005, 
where it is estimated that banking and financial services, petrochemical industries, and 
                                                 
23
 EU-GCC invest was created by several EU and GCC entities under the mandate of the EU-GCC 
Cooperation Agreement.  The aim of EU GCC Invest that was established in 2010 is to promote 
understanding and debate about EU-GCC relations, as well as to promote public awareness and 
understanding of the EU among GCC citizens. (Bossdorf, Engels & Weiler, 2013) 
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telecommunications had concentrated more than half of inflows between 2004 and 2009 
(Ayadi & Gadi, 2013). 
 
Figure 1: EU-GCC Inflows, Outflows and Balance of FDI stocks. Wehrey, F. (2013). 
 
The regional business environment has improved due to projects aimed at privatizing 
important segments of the economy, easing the entry of foreign investors into the GCC, 
and creating free trade zones with other countries. One pattern identified in the study of 
Ayadi and Gadi (2012) is that the direct investments of the EU in the GCC are less than 
the direct investments of the GCC in the EU countries. This therefore proves that there 
also exists an imbalance in investments that is in line with the trade imbalance. (Ayadi & 
Gadi, 2013). 
On the other hand and when discussing wealth funds, the majority of the Sovereign 
Wealth funds and surplus of GCC economies are invested in the EU. Given the lack of 
transparency on such data, the value of GCC total assets are estimated to be around 1 
trillion in 2008. €76 billion out of the €490 billion total surplus is invested in the EU. 
This was a cause of concern for the EU given the large amounts of holding present within 
the EU for GCC states. This led the states of France and Germany to take protective 
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measures to limit such deposits. Nevertheless these concerns were diminished following 
the crisis of 2009 and the positive effects these funds had in helping the European 
economies recover (Ayadi & Gadi, 2013). 
What remains evident is that the relatively small GCC trade trends with the EU have been 
decreasing over the past few years, and the reason is partially due to the economic crisis 
in EU but also due to trade diverting away from the EU towards new emerging regions 
such as the BRICS and ASEAN. This shift towards Asia is largely due to the increased 
demand for mineral fuels in Asian markets. Direct foreign investments and Sovereign 
Wealth Funds still constitute a large proportion of the EU’s economic relations with the 
GCC, yet it seems that both trade trends and investment trades are concentrated in one 
direction.  
The conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement is considered as a venue to open up larger 
capacities of trade between the two blocs, even increasing their international trade. Yet, 
the growing distress from the Gulf over the EU’s non-concessions in the exports tariff 
clause of the FTA, remains a great impediment to this relationship (Ayadi & Gadi, 2012). 
The next section will look into the political relation between the EU and the GCC and the 
relevance of energy trade between the two blocs both politically and economically. 
4.1 EU-GCC Political Relations 
Economic cooperation has dominated in the texts of agreements between the EU and the 
GCC. Whether it was in the Cooperation Agreements of 1989 or the Joint Action 
Programme of 2010, trade, economics and investments took precedence in the texts of 
these agreements. Yet, what the joint communiqués and the achievements of Joint Action 
Programme prove is that these avenues- even though economic in nature- were rather 
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used to develop the political relations between the blocs. While the EU and the GCC have 
been facing disagreement over clauses in the Free Trade Agreement, they have largely 
agreed on a lot of political stances.  
This section looks beyond trade trends that were discussed in the previous section, and 
explores the political avenues in which these two blocs have common interests. The 
European Union Strategy towards the Gulf of the world has been dictated by the 
cooperation agreement of 1989. The European Union refuses to deal with the GCC on bi-
lateral basis and prefers interregional relations in both politics and economics.  
The Cooperation Agreement, as mentioned several times before, remains the framework 
in which these two blocs interact. Initially the EU considered its relations with the GCC 
as part of its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED)
24
; nevertheless, soon they 
came to realize the distinctive nature of this region and the importance of dealing with 
them separately. The main avenue of political relations then became the annual 
ministerial meetings articulated by the Cooperation Agreement.   
The GCC and the EU have had shaky relations in the initial phases of the implementation 
of the CA. It was also used as a method to assert their political presence as a possible 
alternative to the United States uni-polarity at that time. Therefore, early stages of the 
political relation of the EU with GCC were not perceived as ones of high importance. The 
role of the GCC as a political actor was underestimated and even ignored.  
                                                 
24
 The Union for the Mediterranean was formerly known as the Barcelona process and was re-launched in 
2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean, it aims at promoting economic integration and democratic reform 
across 16 EU neighbors. The member states are: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestine, Syria (suspended), Tunisia and 
Turkey. 
 
67 
 
Despite the framework and the underlying motives for strong relations between the EU 
and the GCC, little has been achieved in any of the fields covered by the Cooperation 
Agreement of 1989. “In fact, the Gulf countries were not included in the EU’s external 
cooperation programmes until 2007, when the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 
1934/2006, establishing a financing instrument for cooperation with industrialized and 
other high-income countries and territories (ICIHI) for the years 2007-2013. The 
instrument is allocated a small envelope of €172 million and targets, besides the GCC 
countries, other industrialized nations such as Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United 
States (Ayadi & Gadi, 2012). 
Nevertheless, as the GCC countries developed economically and became interconnected 
with other issues taking place in the region, the EU realized the importance of the GCC 
as an actor and began broadening their engagement with the GCC. While this has not 
been documented due to its informal nature, a shift in political dialogue was witnessed. In 
the current globalized interdependent world, the EU realized the importance of its 
partnership with the GCC as a way of meeting regional and global political and security 
challenges, and constantly strived to assert the importance of the continuation of this 
relationship (Ayadi & Gadi, 2012). 
The European Parliament issued a Resolution (2010/2233(INI)) on the 24
th
 of March 
2011 discussing the relations with Gulf Cooperation Council in all aspects including 
politics, economy, energy, trade, education and research. It asserted that given the 
geopolitical environment in the Middle East, the GCC remains the only stable 
organization based on regional relations.  This in turn makes the Gulf Cooperation 
Council a focus of security challenges that have global and regional implications -
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especially in the Arab uprisings and the continuation of the Iranian Nuclear program (EU 
Parliament Resolution (2010/2233(INI), 2011). 
The Evolution of the EU-GCC relationship was impacted by the evolving regional and 
global economic and political situation. The importance of energy politically and other 
common political/security concerns such as piracy, terrorism and the Arab uprisings will 
be discussed below. 
4.3.1 Trade in Energy 
Trade in mineral fuels, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter, represents a large 
percentage of the EU imports from the GCC. From the EU’s point of view, access to 
steady supplies of oil and gas from the GCC is a priority. This pre-occupation of the EU 
with energy must be understood against the backdrop of the Oil Embargo of 1975 and the 
oil crisis of 1987. The countries of the GCC represent an economic hub especially in 
terms of energy. Four out of the twelve OPEC member states are part of the GCC and 
control 40.8% of the total world oil reserves according to the OPEC bulletin of the share 
of the world’s crude oil reserves in 2012 (OPEC Share of the World Crude Oil Reserves, 
2013). 
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Figure 2: OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2012 
 
EU Commission statistics published on trade between the EU-27 and the GCC show that 
in 2013 75.7 %
25
 of imports to the EU from the GCC were under the category of mineral 
fuels, lubricants and related materials (European Union Trade in Goods with GCC, 
2014). Energy-related products constitute the highest percentage of the GCC exports to 
the EU. This makes the GCC highly dependent on the EU for exports of these products. 
Equally important, the EU is likely to remain dependent on the GCC as one of its main 
energy suppliers. This EU dependence on energy resources from the region helps explain 
the EU’s commitment to the political stability and security of the countries of the GCC. 
From the EU’s perspective, it is highly important to ensure a secure environment in this 
                                                 
25
 The following percentage cited from the EU Statistics is slightly different than the percentages 
mentioned above due to the different definition of sectors by the EU statistical report. Both number are 
cited from the same report but from different tables. 75.7% represents mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials and is taken from the SITC products groupings table. On the other hand, the earlier numbers and 
table 3 used above represent only mineral products at 57.8%. 
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region in order to maintain the unimpeded flow of these energy resources at affordable 
prices. 
Energy has received attention from the outset of the Cooperation Agreement of 1989 and 
the Joint Action Programme of 2010-2013. In both instances, the documents assert the 
importance of cooperation and exchange of views and information on issues pertaining to 
oil and gas as well as safeguarding interregional trade in these two vital commodities. 
The EU Parliament Resolution of 2011 also highlighted the significant degree of 
cooperation between the EU and the GCC on energy matters (EU Parliament Resolution 
(2010/2233(INI), 2011)). 
Given the EU’s interest in reducing the carbon footprint, renewable energy was included 
under the energy cooperation between the two blocs since the drafting of the Cooperation 
Agreement. In 2007 the EU-GCC Clean Energy Network was created because the EU 
was one of the world’s major hydrocarbons importers, while the GCC countries were 
among the world’s leading exporters. The aforementioned project was designed to 
address clean energy issues and develop cooperation activities and policy projects for the 
improvement of clean energy use (EU GCC Clean Energy Network website). 
As was mentioned above, the uninterrupted flow of energy to Europe remains the main 
reason upon which these relations have blossomed. Alongside the GCC, the Russian 
Federation controls the majority of oil and gas exports to the EU, making it also an 
important player. The Russian Federation is the second major trading partner with the EU 
(EU Commission Trade in Goods with GCC, 2014). Roughly 35% of the EU’s imports of 
crude oil come from Russia (EU Energy in Figures Statistical Pocketbook, 2013). 
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Currently, EU relations with Russia are not at their best due to Russia’s conduct in the 
recent crisis in the Ukraine; it is yet to be seen whether this turbulence in EU- Russian 
political relations will affect their partnership in the energy area. 
In 2014, The European Union imposed some sanctions on two Crimea energy firms, 
which the Russians took over during their annexation of the Crimea. The two companies 
are the Crimea-based gas company called Chernomorneftegaz, and the Crimean oil 
supply company called Feodosia. This is the first time that the EU imposes such 
sanctions on these companies. Even while these sanctions are unlikely to impede the 
energy flow from Russia to the EU, there are rising fears that the conflict over the future 
of Ukraine will cloud economic relations between Russia and the EU (Reuters, 2014). 
Against the backdrop of such events, the EU in the coming years is likely looking 
towards the GCC as an alternative source of energy to supplement the possible 
interruption of energy flow from Russia. The FTA between the EU and the GCC is 
currently on hold due to a clause on export duties (Koch, 2014). Thus, the current events 
taking place in Crimea could push the EU to make concessions on the FTA with the GCC  
in order to secure its oil imports at a reasonable price. 
4.3.1 Security 
While the initial agreements between the EU and the GCC centered on economic issues, 
the security of the GCC was always implicitly present on the agenda of relations between 
the two blocs. During the late 1980’s the Gulf Cooperation Council was created in the 
aftermath of security concerns in the region. The Iranian revolution, the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the Gulf War were among the major events that led to the formation of the 
72 
 
GCC. European concerns at that time also coincided with the concerns of the GCC and 
the need of the European Union to assert its presence as an international actor.  
The common security concerns of the European Union and the GCC were discussed 
annually in the ministerial meetings between the two blocs. While these meetings were 
supposed to discuss economic cooperation between the two blocs, disagreement over the 
prospects of a free trade agreement resulted in the diversion of discussions towards 
common political and security concerns. The security and political threats faced in the 
Gulf region are often overlooked because they do not entail direct military threats 
(Wehrey, 2013). 
The EU and the GCC cooperate on issues of non-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and constantly issue statements in the Joint Communiqués urging Iran to 
comply with IAEA and the UNSC resolutions. The two blocs share common interests in 
issues of non-proliferation and are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapon and the Chemical and Biological Weapon Conventions. Efforts also converge in 
promoting a Nuclear Free Zone in the Middle East. Both blocs attempted to contain the 
Iranian threat by limiting the ‘Iranian hegemonic project’ and denying Iran the accession 
of nuclear arsenal (Koch, 2014). 
Piracy, Terrorism and Regional Political Developments have been among the most 
addressed issues according to the joint communiqués published. These communiqués 
even addressed political and security issues that were outside the scope of threats to the 
EU and the GCC (Kostadinova, 2013). The Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb are 
important oil transport routes and are under high threats of piracy and terrorism. An 
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attack on this route can have damaging implications to the regional and global economy 
(Wehrey, 2013). 
4.3.2 Terrorism 
Fredric Wehrey in Combating Unconventional Threats in the Gulf (2013) notes that “up 
to 30 percent of the world’s oil – including all of the oil and natural gas from the Persian 
Gulf heading west – passes through the Horn of Africa every day. Additionally, about 17 
million barrels (more than 18 percent of daily worldwide oil demand) transit the Strait of 
Hormuz daily” (Wehrey, 2013). 
Al-Qaeda and its affiliate groups are the main threats to the internal stability and security 
of the Gulf. Over the past few years however, measures were adopted by western powers 
to undermine the capabilities of such groups. In 2006, Al-Qaeda attempted to attack a 
Saudi oil processing facility in Abqaiq but it failed. The success of such an attack would 
have had huge implications on the Saudi economy and the legitimacy of the regime. 
Jihadists continue to spur aid and support from different groups, but the Gulf States have 
implemented measures to control such activities (Wehrey, 2013). 
Issues of terrorism have long been addressed by the EU and the GCC. The two blocs 
established a working group on combating terrorism and terrorist financing and convened 
their latest meeting in Qatar in 2013 (Janetzke, 2013). Counter terrorism measures have 
been more robust than piracy combating measures, especially in the Gulf Region. 
Nevertheless, these measures were implemented bi-laterally and not on the GCC 
multilateral level. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has been the leader of counter 
terrorism initiatives in the Gulf Region.  
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4.3.3 Piracy 
Piracy threats -as mentioned above- are a serious concern not only for the EU and the 
GCC but also for other countries around the world such as the United States, China and 
Japan. Oil tankers are the first targets for piracy attacks given the large amount of ransom 
they receive in return. In 2012 and according to the International Maritime Bureau, 
nineteen cargo ships were attacked in the Gulf of Aden, eight of which were successful. 
Piracy in the Indian Ocean is a major security concern for the GCC and the EU (Wehrey, 
2013). 
Combating piracy and terrorism in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea has been carried 
out by the United States and the European Union more than it was by the GCC. The 
reason behind this is attributed to the weak regional link and military coordination among 
the GCC member states, along with the preference of unilateral over multilateral relations 
with western powers. The Gulf of Aden currently has around three dozen warships 
patrolling from different parts of the world: The EU Naval force, The US navy, NATO 
and warships provided by Russia, India and China. 
The GCC member states have put efforts into countering piracy but these efforts remain 
incomplete. The Peninsula shield force established a maritime information-sharing center 
in 2010 in Bahrain; nevertheless, this center remains weak and not very effective. The 
Arab Navy Taskforce was also established in 2009 and includes the 6 GCC members and 
Egypt, Sudan, Yemen and Jordan. Yet the activity of this taskforce was also limited and 
focused on operations in Yemen (Wehrey, 2013). 
4.3.4 The Arab Spring 
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The EU and the GCC retain a close relationship despite the stalemate in negotiations on 
the FTA, which led the two sides to focus on regional political development at the annual 
Joint Council meetings. Recent regional developments in the Middle East have led to 
increased cooperation between the EU and the GCC on matters of politics. The Arab 
Spring that started in 2011 in Tunisia spread all the way to Bahrain and threatened the 
security of all the GCC monarchies. The events of the uprisings in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen and Syria forced the GCC states to increase cooperation among each other.  
 The Arab uprisings brought to the forefront the persistence of authoritarian regimes 
especially in the GCC. Even though the EU has maintained high standards of Human 
Rights, these issues were often overlooked when dealing with the GCC. This is one of the 
main reasons why these two blocs have been unable to continue negotiations on the FTA. 
The Arab Uprisings questioned the legitimacy of these regimes and threatened their long 
guaranteed stability as well as the stability of the whole region.  
One of the many unconventional threats to the GCC is the rise of extremist groups and 
ideological parties that oppose the policies of the Gulf States. Such groups included 
Nasserism, Ba’athism, Communism and Revolutionary Shi’ism from Iran. Following the 
Iranian revolution the Gulf has had deep fears of the so-called “Shi’a crescent,” and 
following the Arab Spring these fears re-emerged with the ascendance of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and similar rivalries across the region. Fears from a Shi’a overthrow still 
remain very relevant in Bahrain especially after the Pearl roundabout uprising (Wehrey, 
2013). 
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The Gulf States perceive the current uprisings in Bahrain and the eastern province of 
Saudi Arabia as the makings of the Iranian regime in an attempt to extend its reach into 
the Gulf monarchies. “Aside from the spectre of Shi’ism and Iranian influence, a new, 
potentially more dangerous threat has vexed Gulf leaders: ‘Ikhwan-o-phobia’ or fear of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood threat is especially pernicious 
because it challenges the legitimacy of hereditary rulers using Islamic vocabulary, fused 
with populist rhetoric and a democratic political programme” (Wehrey, 2013). 
When it came to the situation in Syria and Libya, cooperation between the EU and the 
GCC was higher than the cooperation of the EU with the United States. In 2011, The EU 
states of France and UK stood along Qatar and the UAE to overthrow Qaddafi’s regime 
in Libya. With regards to the situation in Syria, coordinated efforts by the EU and the 
GCC have been undertaken to promote regime change and to contain the regional 
repercussions of the conflict. EU member states and GCC member states collaborated on 
funding humanitarian projects in Syria. Both blocs are affected negatively by instability 
and turmoil in the Middle East and have been attempting to build closer partnerships to 
prevent the deterioration of the situation. Whether in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria or Egypt, the 
EU and the GCC have much to lose if the situation escalates (Wehrey, 2013). 
In the wake of the Arab uprisings, the GCC is in danger due to ideological threats that 
arose, and the EU has no advantage in having a turbulent neighborhood. What has been 
evident in the Arab uprisings is that some regimes were successfully overthrown while 
others proved their resilience; the GCC ensured the flow of ample oil rents to prove its 
resilience. The EU did not voice any concerns, and the depth of the relationship between 
the EU and the GCC ensured that the EU would not react negatively to the Saudi and 
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other Gulf States’ blatant military intervention in Bahrain to shore up the khalifa regime 
(Wehrey, 2013). 
The EU and the GCC from the outset of their cooperation have common interests, and 
these interests further converged with economic and political events. The annexation of 
Crimea has possible repercussions on the trade with Russia and possible increase in trade 
with GCC. Piracy and terrorism are major threats within the GCC and the EU and both 
blocs are working on eliminating these threats, especially ones related to transport of 
energy sources.  
Both blocs have major interests in asserting themselves regionally and protecting 
themselves from issues of piracy, terrorism and spillover of crises within the Middle East. 
The two blocs do cooperate on several political issues, yet these relations remain weak in 
comparison to the potential prospects of such a relationship. The two blocs have major 
prospects in increasing their relations both politically and economically. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
Conclusion 
  
5.1 Thesis Basic Findings 
This thesis has presented a study of the interregional relations between the European 
Union and Gulf Cooperation Council. It began with a review of the academic literature 
on regionalism and interregionalism. In light of this review, it examined the evolution of 
trade relations between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. It argued 
that despite decades of economic cooperation, the relationship between the two blocs 
remains a relatively weak one. Outside the field of energy, there is limited cooperation 
between the two entities.  
Following a brief introduction that stated the basic research questions and methodology 
to be followed, chapters two and three provided the theoretical background of the study. 
They also presented basic information on each of the EU and the GCC, as well as 
discussed the evolution of their economic relations. Interregionalism has initially sprung 
out from regionalism and therefore it was essential that regionalism be evaluated as well. 
As discussed in chapter two, it was not until the final phase of regionalism that 
interregionalism emerged. The other two phases were very state-centric and did not 
support relations outside the sovereignty of the state.   
As shown in chapter four, the trade relations between the EU and the GCC are 
asymmetrical: the GCC is more dependent on the exports to the EU than the EU is on 
imports from the GCC. A further dimension of the asymmetry is the concentration of 
GCC exports in petroleum products. The GCC has been unable to significantly increase 
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and diversify its exports to the world. These trade relations have seen a slight set back 
since 2010. In terms of investments, the GCC investments in the EU surpass by large 
margins the EU’s investments in the GCC. The trade and investment imbalance were 
explained in chapter four.  
The weak consensus on the Free Trade Agreement, discussed in chapter three, made way 
for the development of new venues of cooperation. Common political and security 
interests were discussed in the absence of fruitful discussions regarding the FTA. The 
political relationship between the EU and the GCC is dominated by security issues and 
not highly institutionalized. The Joint Council meetings were merely used to reiterate 
common stances on political events, in order to fill the gap that is due to the disagreement 
on the FTA.  
The FTA, as explained in chapter three, has been the main driver behind establishing the 
interregional relationship between the EU and the GCC, but it still has not been 
concluded. There has been relative progress in trade, yet recent trends between the EU 
and the GCC show that trade is beginning to decrease in favor of trade with other 
regional blocs. In conclusion, both political and economic cooperation between the EU 
and the GCC remain limited compared with other interregional relations. There remain 
large prospects for this relationship and the reasons behind the limited scope of these 
relations will be discussed in the section below.  
5.2 Evaluation of EU-GCC Interregional Relations 
Several reasons are behind the slow pace of expansion of these relations and the inability 
thus far to agree on establishing a Free Trade Area. First and foremost, the interregional 
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relations are taking place among partners with unequal capacities. There are significant 
differences between the institutional structures of the two regional blocs. The GCC is far 
less institutionalized with a secretariat that does not have decision-making powers. On 
the other hand the EU members were able to establish a supranational body that speaks 
on their behalf. 
The institutional difference was evident from the early development of the Cooperation 
Agreement. While the Cooperation Agreement of 1989 was signed by the EU high 
commissioner at that time, it had to be signed by each individual head of state in the 
GCC. The decision making process in the EU is a bottom up approach while in the GCC 
it is a top down approach. What results from this is slow communication between the two 
blocs and unequal levels of cooperation (Koch, 2014). 
Another impediment is the prevalence of bilateral relations instead of interregional ones 
between the two blocs, even though the EU formally chooses to deal with the GCC as 
one actor. Bilateral relations take place between individual states like France, Germany 
and Italy and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This causes conflict in policy 
priorities as well as trade diverting towards specific GCC countries and not others. These 
bilateral relations are also evident through the publications of the EU, which disintegrate 
trade statistics to trade with each individual GCC country.  
One factor contributing to this pattern is the similar economies of the GCC countries. The 
GCC countries are all oil and hydrocarbon producers- with the exception of Bahrain- and 
they end up competing over the same commodity. This renders the coordination of all 
these industrial policies between the 6 members very difficult, and the GCC states opt for 
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easier bilateral relations with each of the EU countries in order to increase their 
competitiveness (Ayadi & Gadi, 2012). 
When looking at the political Structure of the GCC states it is clear that the countries in 
this region differ in their governmental structures as well as demographics. For example, 
while Bahrain and Kuwait have rather open political systems with parliamentary 
elections and written constitutions, Saudi Arabia on the other hand is an absolute 
monarchy.  While this region shares common values and cultures, demographically the 
countries differ significantly. The region as a whole constitutes a Sunni majority and 
other minority groups –including the Shi’a- while Bahrain alone constitutes a Shi’ite 
majority and a Sunni minority (Kostadinova, 2014). 
The low regional relations within the GCC have also contributed to the flourishing of 
bilateralism instead of Interregionalism. Intra-regional trade in the GCC has averaged at 
about 7% from 2003-2011 (Ayadi and Gadi, 2012). The depletion of the oil reserves in 
the Gulf over time and the competition between the GCC member states on sales of this 
commodity has forced the GCC countries to diversify their economies and proctor for 
new projects and privatization programs. Nevertheless, this step has led to the prosperity 
of some of these GCC states (Ayadi and Gadi, 2012). 
It is important to point out that while these two regional actors have common interests, 
the individual states intra-regions have different policy projects. This pattern is more 
evident among the GCC than the EU, but it is equally present in both blocs. The 
individual states part of the EU still did not supersede their external relations and military 
power to the supranational entities. Therefore each state still has its own foreign policy 
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and interests that in some instances might be conflicting with the general interest of the 
regional bloc. 
One problem with the interregional relations between the two blocs is that none of them 
constitute a unitary actor. The EU still faces internal divergence with each member state 
opting for its own foreign policy. As already mentioned in chapter three, the EU policy 
towards the Middle East is highly fragmented and barely defined. Even when it comes to 
its relationship with the GCC, the EU still has not managed to define a clear policy 
towards the GCC states and within its overall structure still treats the region as being 
uniform with the rest of the Middle East, despite the many obvious differences 
(Kostadinova, 2013). 
On the other hand, the GCC, which is far less developed institutionally than the EU, 
shows similar trends. Individual states have their separate policy projects and interests 
that compete and sometimes contradict with the general interests of the GCC as a 
regional bloc. This perhaps is due to the lack of development in regional relations in the 
two blocs. Even though the EU is the most successful and longest standing regional 
organization, it still is not a perfect union. 
Along with the trade relations that have flourished between the GCC and other regional 
blocs during the early 90’s -such as the BRICS and ASEAN- relations with the United 
States have also witnessed huge developments. In the Book Unfulfilled Potential: 
exploring the EU GCC relationship the authors argue that the EU-GCC relations were 
initiated by the EU as a break from the U.S. led relations with this region. Even though 
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the EU managed to develop its own interest and relations with the GCC, the United States 
was still the patron of the region (Koch et al., 2005). 
Political changes and advancements in the Gulf region show that the United States, due to 
its position in the international system, has been able to develop strong bi-lateral relations 
with some states in the Gulf region. The United States has remained the Gulf countries’ 
primary and most capable security guarantor (Koch, 2014). The United States and Qatar 
have maintained a close political and security relationship since the early 1990s. The 
United States in 2003 moved its military base from Saudi to Qatar and it concluded a 
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with Qatar in 2004. The U.S is also 
undergoing negotiations with other GCC members on further economic cooperation 
(Blanchard, 2014). 
Interregionalism has to a large extent affected the development of both blocs. 
Interregionalism for the GCC has acted as a tool that helped give access to new 
international markets. While this tool might not have given the expected results with the 
EU, nevertheless it has helped the GCC develop relations with other regional blocs. 
Interregionalism that opened up the GCC market, coupled with high oil prices and 
depleting oil reserves, led the GCC to begin to expand their economies beyond the trade 
of petroleum products.  
When evaluating the GCC’s regional project, one could identify the positive effects this 
has had in the prosperity of the region. It allowed a venue for the Gulf States to share 
common political and economic concerns. Even though, this has also led to negative 
effects such as increased competition, the overall benefits of regionalism to the GCC 
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have been most evident in the prosperity of the GCC member states. The EU GCC 
interregional relationship played a main role in the evolution of the GCC’s regional 
project because the establishment of an FTA between the EU and the GCC depended on 
the evolution of the GCC as a regional actor and the institutionalization of its different 
functions. 
Interregionalism for the European Union on the other hand, has replaced the need to 
formulate a common foreign policy in the Union. The EU now uses interregionalism to 
further its influence and relations with different parts of the world. Interregionalism has 
helped the EU connect with various regions and institutionalize these relations. Alongside 
this, the EU attempted to increase its economic power and influence by negotiating free 
trade agreements with different regions of the world. 
Interregionalism as mentioned in chapter three has five theoretical functions: balancing 
and bandwagoning, institution building, rationalizing, agenda-setting and collective 
identity building. The question remains, were these functions fulfilled in the interregional 
relationship between the EU and the GCC? When it comes to the first function, the EU 
never felt the need to balance with the GCC and vise-versa, and that is largely due to 
different capacities of each blocs.  
On the other hand, the two blocs did bandwagon against the different threats emanating 
from Iran, Iraq and United States Hegemony. Even recent events of the Arab uprising 
show that the EU turned a blind eye to the event taking place in the Gulf, while 
bandwagoning with the Gulf when it came to political actions in Syria. Intuitionally 
speaking, the second function was not very successful because the EU-GCC interregional 
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relations to a large extent remain reliant on one document and the establishment of 
further institutionalized cooperation agreements has been minimal – focused only on low 
level cooperation.  
The functions of rationalizing, agenda-setting and collective identity building have not 
been addressed between the two blocs like they should have, and the interregional 
relations between these blocs was not institutionalized enough to extend the relationship. 
While the EU-GCC interregional relationship has been able to contribute to the evolution 
of both blocs, it did not develop far enough to effect international relations. This to a 
large extent is to be blamed on the pre-occupation of these blocs in enhancing their 
relations and the lack of institutionalization and development in both blocs. 
5.3 The Free Trade Agreement and Beyond 
This study examines the rise of regionalism and interregionalism in order to evaluate the 
interregional relationship between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
as well as the political dimension of this relationship. Section 5.2 above points out all the 
impediments that have slowed down this relationship and decreased its relevance to both 
blocs. Nevertheless, the question remains: what is the prospect of a Free Trade 
Agreement between the EU and the GCC?  
Economic and political indicators are pointing in two different directions. While the 
statistical data might be pointing towards a decrease in trade between the EU and the 
GCC, political advancements around the globe are increasingly highlighting the 
importance of furthering these relations and establishing a Free Trade Agreement 
between the two blocs. The EU has been able to maintain a variety of sources for its 
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energy sector yet it still needs the relationship with the GCC due to the turbulent situation 
with Russia and the large amount of goods exported to the Gulf region.  
Politically on the other hand, the EU still needs to increase security and political 
cooperation with the GCC due to the increased role of the GCC in the fabrics of today’s 
Middle East. GCC states, while competing over control of the region, have been able to 
effectively use oil rents to further their influence and power regionally. Nevertheless, the 
EU still needs to assert itself as a reliable partner to the GCC. A question to pose here is 
the extent to which EU relations with the GCC complement the historic relationship that 
the region has had with the United States or compete with it.  
The GCC will also benefit from the furthering of relations with the EU, both 
economically and politically. Economically, the GCC will secure the presence of a 
European Market for their main commodity, which is fuel products, while also ensuring 
greater foreign investments from Europe in the region and new development projects that 
will further enhance the Gulf economies. Politically, the GCC will need all the foreign 
support it could receive on its regional projects first because of competition within the 
GCC member states and second due to the provision of an additional source of support to 
that historically offered by the United States. 
The setback in trade relations between the EU and the GCC in the wake of economic 
difficulties in the Euro zone has been largely affected by the rise of Asian economies that 
have greater demand for oil and proximity to the Gulf. Asian economies and other 
regional groupings such as Japan, China, BRICS and ASEAN came to replace the 
European Union as the primary trading partner of the Gulf States. It is clear that both the 
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EU and the GCC are losing interest in the FTA, given other opportunities that have had 
greater impacts on their economies.  
Frustration is expressed from both parties over the inability to conclude an FTA.  Current 
developments in the Politics of the Middle East and Eastern Europe indicate that the 
conclusion of the FTA is becoming more pressing and important for both blocs. The 
conclusion of such an agreement would definitely make a remarkable change in the 
economies of both the EU and the GCC. It would also build bridges for stronger political 
cooperation. The FTA negotiations between the two blocs are the longest running non-
concluded interregional negotiations yet. The Free Trade Agreement between the EU and 
the GCC should remain a priority and the failure to conclude it would not be in either 
party's interests. 
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Appendix A: Share of GCC in the World Exports and 
Imports 
KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN  
Share in world total exports  
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Share in world total imports  0.07 
 
Breakdown in economy's total exports 
  
Breakdown in economy's total imports 
  
  By main commodity group (ITS) 
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Fuels and mining products 
 
53.0 
 
Manufactures 
  
 
  9.3 
 
Manufactures 
   
38.8 
 
  By main destination 
  
  By main origin 
 
1. Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of 
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3. China 
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5. United States 
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Share in world total exports    0.65 
 
Share in world total imports  0.15 
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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
Share in world total exports    1.90  Share in world total imports  1.24 
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